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W. Hays Parks* 
Law school professors are known for devising complex, convoluted examina-tion questions with factual situations at best rem otely associated with reality. 
The following, for a fictitious law of war course final examination, might be viewed 
as represen tative: 
State A is a sovereign State with a functioning government enjoying diplomatic 
relations with other nations. It is a member of the United Nations in good standing and 
since 1956 a State party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It is not a State party to the 
1977 Protocols I and II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Stale B invades State A, displaces its government, and installs its own government. 
States C, D, E and others covertly provide funding and other support, including 
weapons, to indigenous resistance movements within State A, eventually forcing State 
B to withdraw. Subsequently, the puppet government installed by State B during its 
occupation is overthrown bya tribal faction (Faction I) covertly funded and supported 
by States C and D. Other tribes (Faction 2), with limited support from outside sources, 
oppose rule by Faction I. Neither replaces the previous government as the factions 
compete for control. The situation deteriorates into a civil war. 
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Factions 1 and 2 are loose amalgamations of occasional if disparate indigenous tribal 
alliances. Following long-standing custom within State A, tribal groups change sides, 
and back again, as battle momentum shifts. Faction 1 replaces personnel casualties and 
tribal defections primarily from a pool of volunteer and dragooned men of the same 
tribe in neighboring State C, divided by an official but artificial border created by an 
unsuccessful colonial power a century earlier that bisects historic. common tribal 
territory. 
Given their heavy financial investment in support of Faction 1 and. in the case of State 
C. for geopolitical reasons, States C and D decide they will recognize Faction 1 as the 
government of State A when Faction 1 gains control of the entire country. Each 
prematurely recognizes Faction 1 when it captures Faction 2's major city. Faction 1'5 
success is short-lived. It suffers a significant military defeat, and retreats from Faction 
2's major city and the territory Faction 2 controls. Resistance to Faction 1 continues 
with varying levels of intensity throughout State A except in its territory of origin, the 
southern one-third of State A. 
Neither State C nor D withdraws its premature recognition of Faction I. State F joins 
States C and D in recognizing Faction 1 in order to continue bird-hunting privileges its 
wealthy leaders enjoy in State A. 
Faction 1 aggressively but unsuccessfully solicits r«ognition as the government of 
State A from the United Nations. the European Union or any of the remaining 190 
nations. It hosts a transnational terrorist group, which trains and organizes foreign 
nationals within State A before the group attacks two embassies of State E in other 
nations, killing 224 civilians and injuring more than 4,000. State E responds with 
limited military action against training camps of the transnational terrorist group and 
requests that Faction 1 deliver to it the leader of the terrorist group. Faction 1 offers to 
do so if State E will recognize it. State E will not, and Faction 1 does not. Stale D support 
of and relations with Faction I deteriorate because of Faction l 's hosting the leader of 
the transnational terrorist group, a former citizen of State D. Faction 1 rapidlyhecomes 
an international pariah. Faction I 's power within the territory it controls declines. 
Subsequently the transnational terrorist group hosted by Faction 1 launches a major 
attack on the territory of State E, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). Almost three thousand people, primarily civilians, representing more than 
ninety nations are killed or missing and presumed dead. The United Nations Security 
Council and NATO support military action against Faction 1 and the transnational 
terrorist group. State E joins with military forces of State G and those of other 
governments to engage in military operations in State A against tribal forces aligned 
with Faction I and the transnational terrorist group. States C, D and F withdraw their 
recognitions of Faction 1. 
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Throughout the fighting, Faction 1 tribes continue to operate in indigenous attire 
under tribal command and control rather than as conventional, highly structured, 
uniformed military forces. Members of the transnational terrorist group dress in all 
black or indigenous attire. Some special operations forces (SOF) from States E. G and 
other nations allied with them working with Faction 2 forces dress in Faction 2 tribal 
attire to avoid being targeted as high-value targets by Faction I and its transnational 
terrorist partners. 
Tribal forces aligned with Faction I abandon their informal alliance with it to join with 
Faction 2 and military forces of States E and G to defeat Faction 1. The leaders of 
Faction I and the transnational terrorist group flee into tribal territorial areas in State C 
A new leader is identified to head a national, democratically elected government in 
State A. His government gains recognition from the United Nations and national 
governments (including States B, C. 0 , E, F and G) as the government of State A. 
In the process of the military operations against Faction I and its transnational terrorist 
partner by States E and G, members of Faction I and the terrorist group are captured. 
What is the law of war status of the members of Faction 1 and transnational terrorist 
group forces captured during operations by States E and G? Had States E and G special 
operations forces wearing Faction 2 attire been captured by Faction 1 forces or its 
transnational terrorist partners, would they have been entitled to prisoner of war 
status? 
Before the al-Qaeda attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the 
military response of the United States against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the sce-
nario would have qualified as humorously improbable enough to have been a law 
school examination question. But it was precisely the situation faced by US and co-
alition military forces as they entered Afghanistan to commence offensive military 
operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in October 200t. 
A sim ple--or perhaps better said, simplistic-approach would be to review the 
four 1949 Geneva Conventions to determine their applicability to Taliban and al-
Qaeda fighters or to the SOF of States E and G wearing indigenous attire of the fac-
tion with which they Were aligned. l However, as the fictitious professor's examina-
tion question suggests, the situation is far from simple. More information is 
necessary from factual, cultural and historical standpoints prior to determining the 
legal statuses of the individuals in question. 
In an essay published in 2003, this author conduded that the Taliban was not the 
government of Afghanistan at the time coalition operations began against it in late 
200P Three highly respected colleagues argued that the Taliban was the de facto 
249 
Combatants 
government of Afghanistan.) Subsequent scholarship by historians. regional ex-
perts, military officers who served in Afghanistan during the period in question , 
official military histories and others provide more information than did contem-
porary media reports. enabling a clearer picture from which to conduct a fresh 
analysis of Taliban status. Moreover, media accounts in large do not understand 
legal nuances, such as the distinction between physical presence of armed groups 
in an area. international law conditions for a group to be regarded as a govern-
ment or law of war criteria for occupation. "Occupation" in media parlance is a 
general term significantly different from the latter. 
Following is a summary of the situation that existed during the period in ques-
tion; analysis of the Taliban's status as a government and the combatant status of 
Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters; brief consideration of the law of war issue of US and 
other nations' special operations forces' wear of indigenous attire as they fo ught 
the Taliban and al-Qaeda; and analysis of the Bush administration's legal rationale 
for denial of prisoner of war status to captured al-Qaeda and Taliban. 
In considering the fact situation and legal determinations one may draw from it, 
two leading scholars have emphasized the importance of information beyond the 
face of applicable treaties. Writing in his classic 1911 War Rights on Land, James 
Moloney Spaight argued: 
War law has never been presented to officers in an attractive form, as it might have been 
(I submit with diffidence) if the writers had insisted on the historical, human, and 
practical side rather than on the legal and theoretical one. But the difficulty of the 
subject, and the necessity for a careful study of it have not been brought home to 
officers: they underestimate its importance and complexity.4 
More than eight decades later, Spaight's view was shared by Sir Adam Roberts: 
The laws of war are strange not only in their subject matter, which to many people 
seems a contradiction in terms, but also in their methodology. There is little tradition 
of disciplined and reasoned assessment of how the laws of war have operated in 
practice. Lawyers, academics, and diplomats have often been better at interpreting the 
precise legal meaning of existing accords or at generalizing about the circumstances in 
which they can or cannot work. In short, the study of the law needs to be integrated 
with the study of history: if not, it is inadequate.5 
While the present author agrees with Spaight and Sir Adam as to the necessity to 
know and understand relevant history in order to apply the law, in cases such as the 
conflict in Afghanistan knowledge of more than history is necessary. An apprecia-
tion of a nation's history, its culture, its geography and other local factors may be 
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necessary. Interpreting and applying the law of war is not always a matter of mirror 
imaging or "one size fits all. " These factors are relevant in interpreting nuances in 
law of war treaties in order to determine their application. Understanding Afghan-
istan's regional and national history, its geography, its culture, political structure 
and law of war history are important in determining whether captured Taliban 
were entitled to prisoner of war status. So, too, are the history of the law of war and 
the history of (and therefore the meaning and intent 00 specific treaty provisions. 
There is no evidence any of these fac tors were considered by senior political leaders 
and legal advisers in providing advice to President George W. Bush with regard to 
prisoner of war entitlement for captured Taliban. Looking at the con flict in Af-
ghanistan between the Taliban and the United States and its coalition partners as 
one might consider an armed conflict in (for example) NOlW"ay, Switzerland or 
Australia is akin to considering the most common way to core an apple while hold-
ing a baseball; each may have the same shape, but o thelW"ise they are uniquely dif-
ferent. Political and military leaders and their legal advisers must be mindfu1 of the 
risk of automatically assuming all opponents and all situations fit neatly within the 
same treaty template. In the opening stages of US operations in Afghanistan , igno-
rance and skepticism of the law of war by some within the Bush administration re-
sulted in errors of law and judgment with respect to the legal basis for law of war 
protection for captured Taliban and al-Qaeda, and the legal rationale for denial of 
prisoner of war status to them.1> 
In this regard this author has heard it said, "As all 194 nations are State parties 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, they have universal applicability." This state-
ment, while fac tually and legally accurate, fails to recognize that legal applicability 
differs from application in fact. The quoted statement tends to suggest a perfect 
mirror imaging in application. The title of the volume in which Sir Adam 's com-
ments are contained-The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western 
World-acknowledges not only the predominately Western European origins of 
the law of war but the challenges that may be faced in its application outside na-
tions of Western European tradition.1 
It is in this context that the question of the statuses of combatants in the war 
fought by the United States and its allies against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Af-
ghanistan in late 2001 is examined. The specifi c time frame will be from the arrival 
of the first US military ground force elements in Afghanistan on October 20, 2001,8 
to the signing of a memorandum by President George W. Bush on February 7,2002 
which, inter alia, accepted the conclusion of the Department of Justice denying 




Afghanistan has been described as having "three constants: perpetual internal 
fighting between tribal ethnic groups, the dominance of Jslam in society, and inter-
vention by external actors using this discord to achieve influence in the country."10 
A nation divided by mountainous terrain, limited in modern transportation devel-
opment and with few large cities contributes to emphasis on tribal loyalty, a highly 
decentralized form of government and strong resistance to central authority by its 
citizens.ll Understanding its culture and local dynamics is critical to understand-
ing Afghanistan; in contrast to Western European nations, controlling Afghani-
stan's capital city of Kabul does not necessarily equal control of the entire nation, 
for example. 12 Even within tribes, rivalries and blood feuds were and are a constant. 
Historian Louis Dupree observed, "No Pashtun [the ruling class in Afghanistan for 
more than two centuries13] likes to be ruled by another ... particularly someone 
from another tribe, sub-tribe, or section. "14 As is the case in other tribal-centric na-
tions, tribes in Afghanistan historically have been inclined to suspend tribal rival-
ries and blood feuds to resist foreign invasion, if only briefly enough to defeat them 
before returning to their internal competition.1$ Shultz and Dew offer a Somali 
proverb that could be said to apply equally well to Afghanistan tribal warrior ways: 
Me and my dan against the world; 
Me and my family against my dan; 
Me and my brother against my family; 
Me against my brother. 16 
In the same context, the same authors, while again referring to d an tradition in 
Somalia, quote I. M. Lewis's observation that applies equally well to Afghanistan's 
tribal traditions: "Although they esteem fighting so highly, the pastoralists have no 
standing military organization or system of regiments. Armies and raiding parties 
are ad hoc formations and while feuds often last for years, and sometimes genera-
tions, they are generally waged in guerrilla campaigns."17 
Afghanistan's history has included invasion by foreign powers and competition 
for its control as a commercial route or "buffer zone" by foreign governments, 
most commonly known for the nineteenth-century competi tion between England 
and Russia firs t named "The Great Game" by Captain Arthur Conolly of the Bengal 
Cavalry, later popularized by Rudyard Kipling in his 1901 novel Kim.ls In fighting 
one another or foreign invaders, alliances often were based on bargaining more 
than loyalties, and loyalties were fleeting. Tribal forces changed sides frequently as 
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each saw the tide of battle shifting or if offered "a better deal" by the opposing force 
or a better chance for post-conflict success. 19 
Interim His tory: The British Colonial Period 
British military histol)' in Afghanistan is long in period of time, extensive, but for 
the most part beyond the scope of this author's topic.20 However, it contains one 
point germane to understanding the situation on the ground in October 2001 and 
through the period in question. 
The artificiality of Afghanistan's borders, particularly with respect to its eastern 
border with Pakistan, is the result of an arbitrary nineteenth-century colonial divi-
sion of tribal territol)' for British security purposes. It is named for Sir Henry 
Mortimer Dumnd, who negotiated and drew a line dividing Wazari tribal territory 
to establish a border between Afghanistan and what today is Pakistan. In addition 
to the fact that a line drawn on a map seldom is easy to find with precision on the 
ground, particularly in termin as rugged as that between Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
the "backdoor" it offered between the two nations played heavily in mujahidin sup-
port in fighting the Soviet occupation and Wazari support for the Taliban follow-
ing the Soviet departure. Permanently resentful of the British-established border 
and accustomed to traveling unfettered by multiple footpaths between the two na-
tions,ll tribal traditions and support in armed conflict against opposing forces-
whether indigenous or foreign-meant more to determining the way the Taliban 
manned, formed and commanded its forces than Western concepts of defined and 
marked borders, their sanctity, and military command and control. Tribal loyalty 
remained paramount.12 
Afghanistan enjoyed relative stability and modernization during the reign of 
King Muhammed Zahir Shah (1933-1973). A "constitutional monarchy" was es-
tablished on October I, 1963.23 On July 17, 1973, his cousin Daoud executed a 
bloodless coup during the king's absence from the country to abolish the monar-
chy and become Afghanistan's first president and head of the communist People's 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Unable to achieve nationwide eco-
nomic and agricultural reform,24 he was murdered five years later by PDPA mem-
bers. His assassination and other PDPA failures eventually led to the overt Soviet 
invasion on December 22, 1979.25 
The Soviet occupation, Afghan resistance and US covert assistance to the latter 
against the former have been well told and became the subject of a popular movie.26 
Soviet forces faced a mujahidin resistance repeating the historic practice of indige-
nous foes joining forces to resist a foreign invader.27 Unable to defeat the 
mujahidin resistance funded and supplied by China, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan and the 
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United States and strongly supported by the indigenous population, the Soviet 
40th Army withdrew on February 15, 1989.28 
US and other fo reign support to the mujahidin led to a case of unintended con-
sequences, as it left heavily-armed forces in Afghanistan, described by one author 
as "a network of jihadis without a jihad. "29 Refugee male children from the Soviet 
war in Afghanistan were placed in Saudi-funded madrassas in Pakistan teaching 
the conselVative Wahhabi rejection of "all modern interpretations of Islam as well 
as the mystical Sufi fonn of Isiam,"X1 in essence providing a "farm club" of holy 
warriors fo r the Taliban in its eventual effort to seize control of Afghanistan even 
before the Taliban existed in name. Foreign financing of the mujahidin resistance 
funneled through Pakistan's Inter-$elVices Intelligence Directorate (ISlO) re-
versed religious toleration and other modern, liberal practices that existed in the 
1970s, replacing them with narrow Islamic views}l 
Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan left in place remnants of the weak 
Afghan (PDPA) Army and the POPA puppet regime headed by President Moham-
med Naj ibullah. While the POPAdemise was regarded as inevitable, it was delayed 
until 1992 as mujahidill allies against the Soviet occupation endeavored to agree to 
a power-sharing agreement, without success. Following Afghan custom, they re-
sumed fighting one another.32 Continued fighting led to a civil war between the 
various factions, collapse of the PDP A, and the replacement of the Najibullah gov-
ernment by one headed by President Burhanuddin Rabbani of the Islamic Council 
of Afghanistan. Tribal fighting continued and lawlessness increased, leading to 
Taliban emergence in 1994}3 President Rabbani's departure in 1996 resulted in 
collapse of the remaining limited central government infrastructure, leaving Af-
ghanistan in the position of a failed State, existing in name only.34 
Taliban characteristics and origins arguably can be traced to the Wahhabi sect 
founded by Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the eighteenth century,3S but its 
contemporary formation originated in 1994 in Pashtun-dominated southern Af-
ghanistan .3/; The Taliban sought to "work with the deep social grain of rural con-
selVatism, not interfering with the power of tribal elders and landowners, as long as 
the people followed Taliban religious practices."17 Its inability to gain international 
recognition, discussed infra, lay in part in the philosophy of its leader, Mullah Mo-
hammed Omar, who departed from Afghanistan's traditional international role, 
expressing indifference with respect to international relations and foreign policy 
and their necessity for Afghanistan.38 Equally important, Loyn obselVes, 
[alt the core of the new antimatter soul being formed for Afghanistan was "anti-
education", in which boys were taught nol about culture or the natural world, and 
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certainly not to think for themselves---the bedrock of education in the developed 
world---but to believe that this was all taken care of for them by Islam. 
The madrassas became factories turning out Taliban fighters, many of them war 
orphans who knew no other life. "Talib" simply means "student", although the word 
came to mean specifically "religious student", and the madrassa system provided a 
formidable old-boy network, giving a sinuous strength and flexibility to the Taliban 
army, which otherwise ltuked a lamia/ command strudure.39 
In the battles of the mid- to late 1990s, momentum ebbed to and fro and, in 
Afghan tradition, tribal warlords and individual tribes switched sides frequently. 
Personnel replacements for Taliban lost in battle or through defections to anti-
Taliban forces were drawn from volunteers from tribal areas in Pakistan and non-
Afghan volunteers.4o Efforts in 1996 by the Pakistani interior minister to have the 
Taliban join in consolidated opposition to the Northern Alliance were rebuffed by 
Taliban leader Mullah Omar. As a result, when the Taliban eventually recaptured 
the Afghan capital of Kabul on September 26, 1996, "they had few friends, and 
never secured the international recognition they craved."41 
Taliban recapture of Kabul did not bring formal recognition from its primary fi-
nancial backers, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It did result in a new warlord alliance 
called the "Supreme Council fo r the Defence of the Motherland" to oppose the 
Taliban.42 The following spring the Taliban began its advance north. Concentra-
tion of agriculture, industry, mineral and gas resources in northern Afghanistan 
made a Taliban offensive critical to its consolidation ofpower.H Political leaders in 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia agreed they would extend formal recognition to the 
Taliban as the government of Afghanistan when and if it controlled the entire 
country, then advanced recognition following Taliban seizure ofthe Northern Al-
liance city of Mazar-i-Sharif on May 24, 1997, optimistically but incorrectly con-
cluding control of the entire country would follow soon thereafter. 
In a set of circumstances reflecting the Byzantine nature of the Pakistani gov-
ernment and despite the fact that Is m agency Chief of Staff Ahmed Badeeb ac-
knowledged that the Taliban "had no clue how to run a country,"44 at ISlD urging 
the Pakistani foreign ministry announced Pakistan's recognition of the Taliban as 
the government of Afghanistan on May 25, 1997, a decision Pakistani Prime Minis-
ter Nawaz Sharif learned of from a television news announcement. His aide re-
called Sharif was "furious,» wondering out loud who had made a decision that was 
his to make.4s 
The ISm , heavily invested in the Taliban in part to provide a safe haven for Paki-
stan's insurgency operations in Kashmir,46 pressed Saudi Arabia to join it in recog-
nition of the Taliban. "Due to Pakistani [ISID ] insistence and to the lack of any 
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other options so as to fill the obvious vacuum" in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia fol-
lowed suit the next day.47 The United Arab Emirates (UAE), whose leadership en-
joyed special hunting privileges in Pakistan and Taliban-controlled western 
Afghanistan, recognized the Taliban two days later.48 
These announcements were premature. Taliban seizure of Mazar-i-Sharif 
lasted only hours following Pakistan's recognition announcement,49 and became a 
deathtrap for Taliban forces. Mazar-i-Sharirs UzbekJShia population, joining 
forces with the Northern Alliance, killed three hundred Taliban and captured an-
other thousand. Taliban killed or captured included its top ten leaders in the as-
sault on Mazar-i-Sharif. so Anti-Taliban forces increased in strength as warlords 
switched sides in an anti-Taliban offensive that killed, captured, or wounded an-
other six thousand Taliban, including 250 Pakistani fighters killed and another 
550 captured. The Taliban swiftly retreated toward Kabul, en route destroying 
crops and poisoning wells,sl relinquishing any claim to control of northern Af-
ghanistan. The civil war intensified as aid and support to anti-Taliban forces in-
creased from Iran, Turkey, India, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan.52 
Nonetheless, and bolstered by the premature recognition by Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE, the Taliban sought US recognition. The Clinton administra-
tion declined. Following a confrontation between pro- and anti-Taliban factions 
within the Afghanistan embassy in Washington in August 1997, the State Depart-
ment ordered the embassy dosed, informing its representatives that "[a]s far as the 
United States was concerned, Afghanistan's existence as a government in the inter-
national system had been suspended."53 No other nation joined Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE in their recognition of the Taliban as the government of Af-
ghanistan. Taliban efforts to gain UN recognition were equally unsuccessful,54 in 
large measure due to its ignorance of "U.N. procedures and even the U.N. Charter" 
and its own counterproductive actions against UN agencies attempting to provide 
humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, such as the High Commissioner for Refugees and 
the World Food Program. An increase in funding by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for 
the Taliban and drafts ofyoungjihadists from tribal areas in Pakistan enabled the 
Taliban to reconstitute its fo rces and in 1998 commence another attack into north-
ern Afghanistan, including a renewed effort to capture Mazar-i-Sharif. While mili-
tarily successful, international antipathy toward the Taliban increased owing to 
Taliban actions against UN officials and non-government organizations; massa-
cres of Uzbek, Tajik and Hazaras civilians in Mazar-i-Sharif; murder of captured 
opposing-force fighters;S5 and the murder of eleven Iranian diplomats taken from 
the Iranian consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif.56 
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The Taliban had become an international par iah. Its status was exacerbated by 
the al-Qaeda attack on US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanza-
nia, on August 7, 1998, killing 213 civilians in the former and eleven in the latter, 
and wounding more than fo ur thousand civilians in the two attacksY The US re-
sponse included a cruise-missile attack on the suspected al-Qaeda training camp at 
Zawhar Kili on August 20, 1998S8 and an end of any further argument of pragma-
tism toward the Taliban within the State Department.s9 International outrage in-
creased with the Taliban's September 18, 1998 destruction of the two thousand-
year-old Buddha statues in Bamiyan.60 The murder of the Iranian diplomats led to 
Iran moving a mili tary force of two hundred thousand to its border with Afghani-
stan; a meeting between Taliban leader Mullah Omar and UN envoy Lakhdar 
Brahimi in Kandahar on October 14, 1998; a strong UN Security Council resolu-
tion threatening and eventually imposing international sanctions against the 
Taliban;61 and Saudi Arabia's withdrawal of its diplomatic representation in Kabul 
and its termination of official funding to the Taliban because of its protection of al-
Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden.62 Additional UN Security Council resolutions 
condemning the Taliban and imposing sanctions followed through 1999,2000 and 
into 2001 prior to the September 11 al-Qaeda attack on the United States as the $e-
curityCouncil "remain [ed ] seized" with the matter.63 By 2000, Taliban support fo r 
Islamic fundamentalist groups from Central Asia, Iran, Kashmir, China and Paki-
stan had led to its further international isolation, increased support toanti-Taliban 
forces64 and increasing signs of the Taliban's weakening grip on territory within 
Afghanistan.6s Reports by the United Nations Secretary-General in Apr il and July 
2001 requested by the General Assembly and Securi ty Council, respectively, are re-
vealing in their conclusions as to the Taliban's failures to act in any way as a gov-
erning authority within Afghanistan.66 
Throughout the period in which the UN Security Council and the Secretary-
General weighed or took actions against the Taliban, at no time did either refer to 
or suggest recognition of the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan. 67 
The al-Qaeda attacks in the United States on September II, 2001 brought a 
rapid military response by the United States, acting under the authority of UN Se-
curity Council Resolution 1368,66 and concurrent political reactions by the three 
nations previously aligned with the Taliban. The United Arab Emirates withdrew 
its recognition of the Taliban on September 22; Saudi Arabia, three days later; and 
Pakistan on November 22. 
As previously noted, US offensive ground fo rce operations against the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda formally commenced on the evening of October 19-20,2001, with 
insertion of two US Army Special Forces detachments.69 In less than two months, 
Taliban and al -Qaeda resistance had collapsed. Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda 
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fled into Pakistan .70 Taliban leader Mullah Omar survived, and fighting would 
continue, but the Taliban as a viable entity had disintegrated.71 
Was the Taliban Entitled Legally to Recognition as the 
Government of Afghanistan? 
The actions of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are illustrative 
of political recognition of a nation or a new government. But recognition by three 
nations out of the 185 members of the United Nations does not warrant the con-
clusion that the Taliban constituted the de facto much less the de jure government 
of Afghanistan for the following reasons: 
• The Taliban was a faction in a civil war in a failed State, that is, a State in 
which no central authority existed capable of carrying out the duties and 
responsibilities of a national government to its citizens. 
As established in the preceding pages, the Taliban 
• Had no organized, uniformed military, no strategic military plans, and 
no fonnal command and control structure characteristic of a regular military; 
• Consisted of tribal forces with little to no formal military instruction;72 
• Was composed of individuals loosely organized along tribal lines who 
rotated between civilian (tribal or family) obligations and serving as fighters 
on a daily or seasonal basis; and 
• Lacked the capadty to fulfill traditional responsibilities of a government, 
such as providing essential services (security, welfare and representation) to 
the people of Afghanistan. 
The United Nations, the European Union and 181 of the 185 nations 
declined to recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan. 
• The Afghanistan seat in the United Nations remained reserved for the 
government of Burhanuddin Rabbani which for all intents and purposes ceased to 
exist in 1994. 
• The civil war did not end with the Taliban as a dear victor occupying, much 
less controlling, Afghanistan . At the time of commencement of US and coalition 
operations on October 20, 2001, the civil war continued, and Taliban power had 
eroded significantly. 
• As the 200 1 Secretary-General's report observed, the Taliban was unable to 
consolidate its military successes outside the predominately Pashtun southern 
Afghanistan region from which it originated. 
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The Taliban refused to acknowledge Afghanistan's pre-existing international 
obligations, such as those of being a member of the United Nations, or through its 
actions as a State party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.73 
International law requirements for existence as a State are historic: 
First, there must be a people .... 
Second, there must be a fIXed territory which the inhabitants occupy . . 
Third, there must be an organized government exercising control over, and 
endeavoring to maintain justice within, the territory. 
Fourthly, there must be capacity to enter into relations with the outside world. 
Fifthly, the inhabitants of the territory must have attained a degree of civilization such 
as to enable them to observe with respect to the outside world those principles of law 
which are deemed to govern the members of the international society in their relations 
with each other.14 
The State of Afghanistan previously joined and was accepted into the commu-
nity of nations as a member of the United Nations. Its ratification of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions in 1956 was accepted by Switzerland, the depositary. No State 
objected to its ratification of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Hence it may be pre-
sumed that each State regarded Afghanistan as having met statehood criteria one 
and two. Were all other questions answered in the affirmative, a question would re-
main as to whether in its time as a failed State and with the ascendancy of the 
Taliban it continued to meet the third, fourth and fifth criteria. The third criterion 
does not say "exercise control over a substantial portion of' a nation's territory, or 
suggest a percentage of territorial control as threshold criteria, but the territory as a 
whole. As to "maintaining justice within the territol)'," Professors Goldman and 
Tittemore acknowledge "the Taliban exercised few, ifany, ofthe traditional activi-
ties of government."7S This cannot be dismissed entirely as a chamcteristic of 
Afghan culture; more likely it is affirmation of the fact that the resources for the 
Taliban to govern were unavailable because they had been diverted to fighting the 
contin uing civil war. In turning inward under the leadership of Mullah Omar, the 
Taliban defaulted on the fourth. In the wholesale murder of foreign diplomats, 
representatives of non-governmental organizations, its civilians because of differ-
ent religious beliefs, and captured fighters-violations of human rights law and the 
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law of war-there is no evidence the Taliban met the fi fth criterion essential to its 
qualification as the government of Afghanistan.76 
Assuming fo r sake of argument the five criteria couJd be met for the failed State 
of Afghanistan to restore its place among its peers, there remains the question of 
whether the Taliban itself became the rightful government of Afghanistan at any 
time prior to its defeat and collapse in December 200 1. Changes internal to a na-
tion are regarded as matters of domestic concern.n That said, 
[il nasmuch. however, as the government of a State is the instrument through which it 
has official contact with the outside world and undertakes to respond to official 
obligations, a change of government and the methods by which it is wrought are 
matters of concern to fo reign countries. They are concerned primarily with a question 
of fact- whether the regime seeking recognition is in actual control of the reins of 
government. No difficulty presents itself when a change is wrought through normal 
processes and the result is accepted as a mere incident in the life or growth of the State 
concerned. The situation may be obscure. however, when a contest for governmental 
control is waged by force of arms or by other processes not contemplated by the local 
law; the completeness of the success of a contestant may be fai rly open to doubt fo r 
a protracted period, and even after its adherents assume to exercise the functions of 
a government. In such case foreign States may, and oftentimes do, withhold 
recognition until they are themselves assured where the victory really lies. The 
sufficiency of such assurance depends obviously upon the circumstances of the 
particular case; and it may follow dose upon the heels of a coup d'etat. The matter is 
unrelated to the mode whereby the success of a regime is achieved, except in so far as 
recourse to a particular method may breed doubt as to the security or permanence of 
the control that has been won?! 
The decision as to whether or not to recognize a State, or a new government in a 
State, resides in governments of other sovereign nations, and, within a govern-
ment, with the executive branch of each. 79 
By analogy, the law of war provides a way in which to determine whether the 
Taliban had gained de facto or de jure status. State A invades State B. In doing so, 
its military forces physically seize a portion of State B's territory. Under the law of 
belligerent occupation State A becomes an occupying power only when the terri-
tory State A's forces physically occupy "is actually placed under the authority of 
the hostile army."80 Further, the occupation "extends only to the terri tory where 
such authority has been established and can be exercised."81 A claimant must be 
able to exercise effective control; that is, an occupying power must be in a posi-
tion to enforce the authority he is asserting over the territory and meet the obliga-
tions of an occupying power, which includes governing and providing various 
services (such as security and welfare ) to the civilian population necessary to meet 
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its day-to-day requirements. tl2 Assuming this analogy is reasonable. the history of 
the civil war between Taliban and anti-Taliban factions from 1994 to 2001 never 
resulted in a situation in which the Taliban was able to enforce the authority it 
may have asserted over the territory it physically occupied, much less all of Af-
ghanistan. The Secretary-General 's July 13, 200 1 report that "[aJ II regions of the 
country, with the exception of the southern [Pashtun J region, now include active 
conflict zones"8' confirms the conclusion that while the Taliban may have en-
joyed a physical presence in a large portion of Afghanistan. it was unable to con-
solidate its military gains and exercise effective control over these areas, much less 
establish the infrastructure to govern them. These are critical legal distinctions 
that media reports failed to make. 
The facts on the ground and international law do not support a conclusion that 
the Taliban was the de facto, m uch less de jure. government of Afghanistan at any 
time from its emergence in 1994 to October 20, 2001, when US and coalition mili-
tary operations commenced against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.8-t 
Combatant and Prisoner o/War Status and the Taliban and AI-Qaeda 
Accepting arguendo the US position that its intervention in Afghanistan was an in-
ternational armed conflict, entitlement to the combatant's privilege and, therefore. 
prisoner of war status upon capture is determined by provisions contained in Arti-
cle 4 ofthe Geneva Convention (1Il ) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
of August 12. 1949 (hereinafter GPW).85 Relevant GPW provisions provide entitle-
ment to humane treatment to captured individuals entitled to the combatant's 
privilege. 
Combatants are members of the established armed forces of a government who 
have a legal right to engage in combat operations. Combatants enjoy "combatant 
immunity" under international law, protecting them from prosecution for death 
or injury to persons or damage or destruction of property resulting from combat-
ant acts that otherwise comply with the law of war in an armed conflict.86 A 
combatant 
• Has the right to carry out lawful attacks on enemy military personnel and 
military objectives; 
• Is at risk of attack by enemy military forces at any time, wherever located. 
regardless of the duties or activities in which he or she is engaged; 
• Bears no criminal responsibility (a ) for killing or injuring (i) enemy military 
personnel or (ii) civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, or (b) for causing 
damage or destruction to property incidental to lawful military operations. 
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provided his or her acts, including the means employed to commit those acts, have 
been in compliance with the law of war; and 
If captured: 
Is entitled to prisoner of war status, 
May be detained indefinitely until cessation of active hostilities, 
Is entitled to humane treatment, 
May be tried for violations of the law of war, and 
May only be punished for violations of the law of war as a result of a 
fair and regular trial. 
Limitations on entitlement to the combatant's privilege are historic and an es-
sential component of the equally historic law of war principle of discrimination. Al-
though the origins of the modern law of war can be traced to classical Greek and 
Roman times, the Middle Ages provided its greatest development prior to the mid-
nineteenth century. Today's law of war began as an amalgamation of the jus 
mi/itaire, recognized military practice contained in rules of chivalry, and canon law 
known as the just war tradition.87 Both jus militaire and the just war tradition in-
cluded a requirement for "public war," that is, war authorized by right (that is, 
competent ) authority. In the jus mi/itaire, "public war" was the "antithesis of per-
fidy and cowardly assassinations, actions repugnant to the conception of chivalry 
and the membership of the various knightly orders in which knights belonged. "sa 
Individuals engaging in unauthorized acts of war were acting outside "'faith and the 
law of nations." They were regarded as "marauders and freebooters," treated as war 
criminals if captured, and usually summarily executed.89 
Paralleling right authority was the principle of discrimination/noncombatant 
(civilian ) immunity. In the conduct of military operations, commanders were ob-
ligated to exercise reasonable care to protect innocent civilians from the harmful 
effects of combat operations. It also obligated combatants to distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population, and obligated civilians not to engage in combatant acts. 
Through the near century and a half of development of the modern law of war, 
governments have retained exclusive authority to wage war for practical, political 
and humanitarian reasons. First is the responsibility of a government to protect its 
citizens. Second, a desire for stability in international relations necessitates a prohi-
bition of unilateral acts by a civilian or civilians that may lead to war between na-
tions.90 Third, the prohibition on civilians engaging in combatant acts selVes to 
implement and enforce the law of war principle of discrimination. 91 The private cit-
izen who engages in battle is not entitled to the combatant's privilege and forfeits 
his or her protection as a civilian from direct attack for such time as he or she takes 
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a direct part in hostilities.'12 If captured, he or she is not entitled to prisoner of war 
status and may be prosecuted for his or her actions. 
Codification of the modern law of war and these distinctions originated in the 
midst of the US Civil War (186 1--65). Dr. Francis Lieber, a Columbia College law 
professor, offered to draft a document for the Union Army delineating in practical 
terms existing law of war rules. President Lincoln accepted Lieber's offer. Signed by 
President Lincoln on April 24, 1863, as US General Orders No. 100, Lieber's In-
structions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field became the 
primary source for treaty law developed over the next century. 
Of direct relevance to the present discussion is a less-known product requested 
of Professor Lieber. On August6, 1862, Henry Wager Halleck, General-in-Chief of 
the Union armies, wrote to Lieber seeking his advice and assistance in addressing 
the issue of private citizens engaging in unauthorized acts of war and Union law of 
war obligations toward captured Confederate guerrillas. General Halleck viewed 
partisans and guerrillas as synonymous. Professor Lieber made a distinction be-
tween the two in his essay reply, "Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to 
the Laws and Usages of War." Lieber argued that partisans enjoy a formal associa-
tion with a government and its military forces (and entitlement to prisoner of war 
status), while guerrillas were 
self-constituted sets of armed men, in times of war, who form no integrant part of the 
organized army, do not stand on the regular pay-roll of the army, or are not paid at all, 
take up arms and lay them down at intervals, and carry on petty war (guerrilla) chiefly 
by raids, extortion, destruction, and massacre, and who cannot encumber themselves 
with many prisoners. and will therefore generally give no quarter.93 
While Lieber does not identify opposing forces that might have been illustrative 
of each category, the Virginia cavalry unit commanded by Confederate Colonel 
John S. Mosby94 is regarded as meeting Lieber's category of partisans, and therefore 
lawful combatants, while William C. Quantrill's private group of raiders in 
Missouri9s were guerrillas (as he used the term in his analysis), and, as such, not en-
ti tled to the combatant's privilege or prisoner of war status.96 
Lieber maintained this distinction in General Orders No. 100. Article 57 states, 
"[s]o soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier's oath 
of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not in-
dividual crimes or offenses ... ," while acknowledging in Article 59 that "raj pris-
oner of war remains answerable for his crimes committed against the captor's army 
or people ... . " Article 81 of General Orders No. 100 states: 
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Partisans are soldiers armed and wearing the uniform of their army, but belonging to a 
corps which acts detached from the main body for the purpose of making inroads into 
the territory occupied by the enemy. If captured, they are entitled to all the privileges of 
the prisoner of war. 
In contrast, Article 82 declares: 
Men, or squads of men. who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, or inroads fo r 
destruction or plunder. or by raids of any kind. without commission, without being 
part and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in 
the war, but who do so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or 
with the occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting 
themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers--such men, or squads of men, 
are not public enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of 
prisoners of war, but shall be t reated summarily as highway robbers or pirates. 
Fratlc-tireur actions in the Franco-Prussian War and the debate over military 
operations by Boer farmers dressed in civilian clothing in the Anglo-Boer War 
(1899-1902) brought the issue to international attention at the First International 
Peace Conference, held in The Hague in 1899. 
Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
was among the treaties adopted by the 1899 Hague Peace Conference. Article 3 of 
its Annexed Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land states: 
"The armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of combatants and non-
combatants."97 In case of capture by the enemy both have a right to be treated as 
prisoners of war. 
Following Professor Lieber's lead, recognition as armed forces was provided not 
only to the regular forces of a belligerent but also to other forces in Article 1: 
The laws, rights. and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and 
volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: 
1. To be commanded by a person responsible fo r his subordinates; 
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
3. To carry arms openly; and 
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
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In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or fonn a part of it, 
they are included under the denomination "army." 
Enti tlement to lawful combatant and prisoner of war status for organizations 
other than the regular forces of a nation was provisional. It was dependent upon 
these fo rces acting under government authority and complying strictly with the 
four conditions listed. Failure of compliance resulted in denial of the combatant's 
privilege. Individuals acting unilaterally outside an organization were no t enti tled 
to the combatant's privilege. 
Development of railroads in the late nineteenth century facilita ted rapid de-
ployment of m ilitary forces, prom pting fear by smaller nations such as Belgium 
and the Netherlands of threats posed by stronger powers such as France and Prus-
sia. Article 2 of the Annex to the 1899 Hague II provided conditional combatant 
status to what is referred to as a levee en masse, as follows: 
The population of a terri tory which has not been occupied who, on the enemy's 
approach, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having 
time to organize themselves in accordance with Article I, shall be regarded as 
belligerent, if they respect the laws and customs of war. 
The Martens Clause 
The participating nations appreciated that Hague Convention II was a first effort at 
international codification of the law of war for ground forces. Of particular impor-
tance to the topic of this chapter is language contained in the main treaty: 
It has not ... been possible to agree forthwith on provisions embracing all the 
circumstances which occur in practice. On the other hand, it could not be intended 
by the High Contracting Parties that the cases not provided for should, for want of a 
written provision, be left to the arbitrary judgment of the military commanders. 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties 
think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by 
them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the 
principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between 
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of public 
conscience. 
This provision, referred to as the Martens Clause,1IS was the result of a debate 
over the status of private citizens who took up arms following enemy occupation. 
Delegations representing m ajor European m ilitary powers argued that such indi-
viduals should be treated as unlawful combatants subject to summary execution if 
captured. Smaller European nations argued that they should be regarded as lawful 
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combatants as each citizen has a d uty to his nation to resist enemy presence. The 
argument essentially was one for levee en masse ''plus, »a continuous resistance to 
enemy occupation. In the end, private citizens who took up arms in resistance to 
enemy occupation remained unprivileged combatants.99 This prompted incorpo-
ration of the Martens ClauseYIO 
These provisions were repeated verbatim or without substantive change in 
Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land adopted 
by the Second International Peace Conference in The Hague, on October 18, 
1907.101 
A h umanitarian basis existed for the decision taken by delegations to the two 
Hague Peace Conferences. As one international lawyer commented: 
The separation of armies and peaceful inhabitants into two distinct classes is perhaps 
the greatest triumph of International Law. Its effect in mitigating the evils of war has 
been incalculable .... But if populations have a war right as against armies, armies have 
a strict right against them. They must not meddle with fighting. The citizen must be a 
citizen and not a soldier. 102 
The law of war principle of discrimination prohibits military forces from engag-
ing in direct attack of innocent enemy civilians and the enemy civilian population 
in general. In addition to obligating military forces to distinguish themselves phys-
ically and in appearance from the civilian population, the principle of discrimina-
tion obligates civilians to refrain from engaging in combatant acts, as such actions 
may place the general civilian population at risk. That said, the Martens Clause ac-
knowledged the existence of unspecified but minimum standards of protection 
and humane treatment for unprivileged combatants upon capture. The Bush ad-
ministration's express rejection of Common Article 3 application in US operations 
in Afghanistan neglected to acknowledge that the United States, as a State party to 
the 1907 Hague Convention IV, was bound by the Martens Clause in the 1907 
Hague Convention IV. The Bush administration's focus solely on the last fo ur (of 
six) criteria in Article 4A, paragraph 2, GPW, discussed infra, also neglected the 
possible legal significance of the Martens Clause. 
World War II 
The 1939 invasion of major portions of Europe by Germany that began with the 
German invasion of Poland on September 2,1939, and of Asia by Japan following 
its attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, eventually brought organized re-
sistance against Axis occupation on a scale previously unseen. The resistance 
movement within the Soviet Union was massive and well organized by the Soviet 
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government. I03 The British Special Operations Executive (SO£ ) and US Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) provided organization, training, equipment and other 
support to indigenous resistance movements in twenty nations under Axis con-
trol. IO( Resistance to enemy occupation argued for in 1899 by Belgium and other 
smaller nations, all victims of German or Japanese occupation in World War II, be-
came reality. The World War II resistance experience prompted revisitation of the 
1899 debate regarding law of war recognition of a levee etl masse "plus" and a major 
change at the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference in entitlement to combatant 
and prisoner of war status. 
1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference 
The 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference met in 1949, completing (from drafts) 
and adopting four conventions: 
• Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949;105 
• Geneva Convention (II ) for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea;106 
Geneva Convention (Ill) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar;I07 
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War. 108 
The Geneva Conventions are specific and exclusive in providing enti tlement to 
protection. Thus the first convention provides protection for military wounded 
and sick and medical units, personnel, and transport, while the second convention 
protects military wounded, sick and shipwrecked and their associated fac ilities, 
units, and transport. Legal obligations with respect to protection of and care forci-
vilian sick or wounded, civilian medical facilities, and civilian medical transport 
are not included. 109 
Similarly, Article 4 of the GPW is specific in identifying and limiting individu-
als entitled to prisoner of war status, while the civilians convention is equally spe-
cific in identifying the circumstances in which civilians in enemy hands are 
entitled to protection. The prisoner of war and civilians conventions did not pro-
vide all-encompassing, seamless entitlement to protection, but are quite specific 
in their respective applications to particular individuals. 
With respect to private civilians engaged in combat actions, the prisoner of war 
convention is directly relevant to the topic at hand. 
The criteria for prisoner of war enti tlement were reconsidered in light of the 
World War 11 experience with State-sponsored organized resistance movements. 
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Paragraph 1 of Article 4A of the prisoner of war convention reconfirms entitlement 
to prisoner of war status for members of the regular armed forces and militias or 
volunteer corps of a government. 110 Paragraph 2 amended the criteria for combat-
ant and prisoner of war status for groups not falling within paragraph 1: 
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, indudillg those of 
organized resistance movemmts, belollgillg to a party to the collf/iet and operating in or 
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias 
or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the 
following conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible fo r his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fIxed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of 
war.I ll 
The International Committee of the Red Cross's (JCRe) Jean S. Pictet acknowl-
edges that recognition of entitlement to combatant and prisoner of war status for 
State-sponsored resistance groups in enemy-occupied territory "was an important 
innovation which grew out of the .. . Second World War."II! Fully cognizant of the 
World War II resistance experience, government delegations to the 1949 diplo-
matic conference declined to expand protection to all private armed groups. The 
historic criteria of righ t authority remained fundamental to enti tlement to combat-
ant and prisoner of war status. 
A common mistake by lay persons, non-international law lawyers, some inter-
national law lawyers and, in the case at hand, by senior legal advisers and 
policymakers in the Bush administration is to recite the four criteria in (a) through 
(d) of Article 4A(2) as the criteria for any armed group to be eligible for combatant 
and prisoner of war status. This is a fundamental misunderstanding of the law of 
war and, in particular, of Article4A(2), GPW, and the rationale and history behind 
it. Extension of combatant and prisoner of war status in Article 4A(2) is intention-
ally and expressly narrower. Combining Articles 2 and 4A(2), there are seven crite-
ria, all of which must be met: 
First, there must be an international armed conflict, that is, an armed conflict 
between two or more nations.I13 
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Second, the individual who falls into enemy hands after engagement in combat-
ant activities must be a member of an organized resistance movement, that is, he or 
she cannot be acting unilaterally or as a member of a levee en masse in which private 
citizens respond spontaneously.ll~ 
Third, the organized resistance movement to which the individual belongs must 
be operating under the authority and support of a government that is a party to the 
conflict, that is, it must have right aut}lOnty. In World War II, this authori ty was 
manifested through training, logistical, communications and other support, pro-
vided by governments-in-exile with the assistance of the British SOE and American 
OSS, and military forces supporting them, such as with sealift and airlift for deliv-
ering supplies and agents, lIS as well as overtly through official pronouncements. 116 
The preceding criteria are prerequisites before the four remaining criteria in Ar-
ticle 4A(2) are applicable. The first two criteria in Article 4A(2) are a threshold that 
must be crossed before the last four can be considered. II? If an armed group meets 
the threshold criteria, consideration must be given to whether or not the armed 
group meets each and every one of the remaining criteria listed in Article 4A(2 ). I HI 
The 1949 change entitled members of an organized resistance movement oper-
ating under the authori ty of a government-but only organized armed groups op-
erating under government authority-to prisoner of war status. The requirement 
for such movements to "conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war" confirmed the combatant's privilege and provided lawfuJ combat-
ant status. 
The change in entitlement reflected the experience of World War II resistance 
movements while codifying the distinction between organized, State-sanctioned 
partisans and private guerrillas made by Francis Lieber during the American Civil 
War. Equally important, delegates to the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference de-
clined to provide lawfuJ combatant or prisoner of war status to private citizens act-
ing without government authority. 
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War (GC) by its title and the language of Common Article 2 applies only in an 
international armed conflict between two or more nations. The GC filled a gap 
(that is, protection for civilians in enemy hands, including in enemy-occupied ter-
ritory). Article 5, paragraph 3, provides limited protection to a civilian "suspected 
of or engaged in activities hostile to the State" in an international armed conflict as 
it is defined in Article 2. Private citizens who engage in combatant-like actions 
other than in occupied territory or enemy territory do not receive protection under 
the Geneva civilians convention. This excludes transnational terrorists from pro-
tection under that treaty. 
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Governments participating in the 1949 diplomatic conference did not intend 
that the four 1949 Geneva Conventions provide a seamless "safety net" of protec-
tion for all persons, in particular private individuals or organizations who conduct 
armed attacks without government authority. The negotiating record of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions is clear that the conventions were not intended to and do not 
provide protection to unprivileged belligerents. In the course of the 1949 diplo-
maticconference, the delegate representing the ICRC stated that "although the two 
conventions might appear to cover all categories concerned, irregular belligerents 
were not actually protected."1l9 Similarly, the representative of the United King-
dom stated "the whole conception of the . . . [Geneva civilians convention I was the 
protection of civilian victims of war, and not the protection of illegitimate bearers 
of arms." 
In the development of the law of war from the mid-nineteenth century through 
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, combatant status and prisoner of war protec-
tion was extended to members of a levee en masse (as noted, limited in scope and 
time) and to organized resistance movements operating in enemy-occupied terri-
tory under the authority of a government provided each met rigid conditions for 
distinguishing themselves from the civilian population and carrying out their op-
erations in accordance with the law of war. In keeping with the centuries-old stan-
dards that originated in jus militaire and the just war tradition, governments 
steadfastly have refused to provide legitimacy to or legal recognition for private 
armed individuals or groups acting without government authority and responsi-
bility. The historic condemnation of private armed groups remains through their 
exclusion from combatant or prisoner of war status for the overall protection of the 
civilian population. Governments over the centuries consistently have given 
greater priority to the protection of their civilian populations and individual civil-
ians over entitlement to prisoner of war status for private armed groups, in part to 
dissuade private citizens from taking up arms and waging war without government 
authori ty and in respect for the law of war principle of discrimination. 
With this history in mind, the status of members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
may be weighed. 
Al-Qaeda 
The history of Afghanistan and the fighting in the two decades prior to al-Qaeda's 
attack on the United States on September II, 2001 focused on the Taliban. Al-
Qaeda's history within Afghanistan and overall is loosely intertwined with the 
Taliban. Al-Qaeda was founded by Usama bin Laden,scion ofa wealthy Saudi fam-
ily, in protest against Saudi Arabia's consent to US bases in Saudi Arabia in the 
buildup to, and execution of, the 1991 coalition liberation of Kuwait from iraq.120 
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Bin Laden, a veteran of the mujahidin battles of the 1980s against Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan, arrived in Jalalabad,Afghanistan, on May 18, 1996, an area not un-
der Taliban control and without invitation from the Taliban.l2l He had an agenda 
separate from, and broader than, the Taliban's battle within Afghanistan: a trans-
national jihad against the West and, in particular, the United States. 
An extended discussion ofUsama bin Laden and al-Qaeda's activities is unnec-
essary. Professors Goldman and Tittemore describe al-Qaeda as "a quintessential 
non-State actor," stating, "President [Bush] and Defense Secretary [Rumsfeld[ are 
unquestionably correct in their depiction of al-Qaeda as an international terrorist 
organization."122 Professor Toman agrees with Professors Goldman and Tittemore 
with respect to their first conclusion, declaring, "On the basis of this very short 
practical analysis, we can easily conclude, that al-Qaeda members cannot benefit-
in any circumstances-from the status of prisoners of war." Nor does a law of war 
basis exist for al-Qaeda members to enjoy the combatant's privilege. 123 
The Taliban 
Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva prisoner of war convention identifies persons entitled 
to prisoner of war status. Prisoner of war entitlement differs from combatant sta-
tus, the latter being narrower in scope. 124 
The preceding pages establish that the Taliban was not the government of Af-
ghanistan. That said, it is necessary to review the relevant provisions in Article 4 to 
determine whether captured Taliban are entitled to prisoner of war status. 125 
Articfe4A(1) 
Article 4A( 1) provides prisoner of war status to "[m[embers of the armed forces of 
a Party to the conllict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming 
part of such armed forces." 
In the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the term "Party to the conllict" means a 
"Contracting Party" or "High Contracting Party," in each case referring to a gov-
ernment that has ratified or acceded to the conventions. As noted in the JCRC 
Commentary, 
Each State contracts obligations vis-a-vis itself and at the same time vis-a-vis the others. 
The motive ofthe Convention isso essential for the maintenance of civilization that the 
need is felt for its assertion, as much out of respect for it on the part of the signatory 
Sta te itself as in the expectation of such respect from all parties. l 26 
As only governments may contract on behalf of a nation or, said differently, 
only governments may agree to become parties to the conventions, the term 
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"Party to a conflict" refers to an armed conflict between the military forces of two 
or more nations. An armed private group may choose to participate in an inter-
national armed conflict on one side or another, but its participation does not 
make it a "Party to the conflict" in the sense that phrase is used in the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.127 
In the same vein, the term "armed forces" refers to "all members of the regular 
armed forces of a nation,"121! to include members of its reserve or militia forces. It is 
left up to each government to determine how its military is to be composed. In the 
United States, this includes the reserve component of each of its four military ser-
vices and the National Guard when the latter have been activated by the President. 
The term "militia" in Article 4A( 1) does not refer to private armed groups. 
As the Taliban was not the government of Afghanistan in fact or in law, it was 
not a "Party to the conflict" as that term is used in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Nor were the Taliban part of the military of Afghanistan, as it no longer existed. 
Neither a national government (other than perhaps in name only with respect to 
the Rabbani government) nor a national military force existed during the period in 
question. 
Two issues arose in the debate over the Taliban and its status. As noted in the 
factual summary, the Taliban did not have the formal unit structure of a Western 
army. Similarly, some Taliban fighters ("non-Afghan Taliban") were from Paki-
stani tribes, while other figh ters came from other nations. Were this a case in which 
the Taliban had been the government of Afghanistan and its military the regular 
military of Afghanistan, and therefore members of its forces falling under Article 
4A( I), neither issue would have been a basis for denial of entitlement to prisoner of 
war status. Other than in the most general terms, such as command responsibility, 
the GPW does not specify force structure requirements. Further, the GPW is silent 
and State practice extensive with respect to the national origin of a member of the 
regular military forces . For example, US citizens joined British Commonwealth 
military forces and served in World Wars J1 29 and lI,J3o and the US military rou-
tinely enlists foreign nationals residing in the United States in its armed forces, of-
ten through the enticement of US citizenship following completion of a successful 
initial enlistment toUr. 131 While Pakistan covertly supplied the Taliban with arms 
and ammunition and other support during the 1994-2001 Afghan civil war, and to 
a degree facilitated the movement of Pakistani tribesmen to join the Taliban, it was 
not an acknowledged party to the conflict in Afghanistan. As such, Pakistani and 
other non-Afghans who joined the Taliban were entitled to no greater status under 
the law of war than were Afghan members of the Taliban. 
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Article 4A(2) 
As noted earlier, Article 4A(2), GPW, was an outgrowth of the World War II ex-
perience of organized resistance movements operating under the authority and 
with the support of the former governments of nations under Axis control. 132 It 
does not provide entitlement to prisoner of war status to all private armed 
groups, but only to those operating with government authority. In this respect it 
repeated the formula articulated by Dr. Francis Lieber in his 1863 "Guerrilla Par-
ties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages ofWar,"tn and proposed 
in the form of an extended levee en masse at the First Hague Peace Conference in 
1899 by Belgium and other smaller military powers, without success.l:M The 
World War II government-sanctioned resistance movement experience prompted 
reconsideration of the issue and a guarded and highly conditioned broadening of 
entitlement to prisoner of war status only to organized anned groups acting under 
government authority. 
Assuming arguendo that there was an international armed confli ct upon com-
mencement of US and coalition offensive ground operations against the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda on October 20, 200 1, the Taliban did not meet the six criteria in Ar-
ticle 4A(2). Arguably it was an organized armed group, but loosely organized 
along tribal lines. Prior to commencement of US and coalition military opera-
tions, the Taliban had been financially and to some extent logistically supported 
by the Pakistan Ism and Saudi Arabia in the civil war in Afghanistan. Saudi Ara-
bia had withdrawn its support and Pakistan withdrew support.135 As noted, nei-
ther was a "Party to the conflict" in the Afghan civil war. The Taliban were not 
entitled to prisoner of war status under Article4A(2), as it failed to meet all sixcri-
teria therein. 
Article4A(3) 
Article 4A(3) entitles "[mJembers of regular armed forces who profess allegiance 
to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power" to pris-
oner of war status and enti tlement. 
This provision, new in the 1949 Convention, was based upon the experience of 
World War II, as members of the armed forces of nations conquered and occupied 
by Germany continued the fight under their respective governments-in-exile. l.36 
Jean S. Pictet, in the Commentary on the GPW he edited on behalf of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, makes it dear that the point of reference for 
Article 4A(3 ) was the Free French: "This provision must be interpreted, in the first 
place, in the light of the actual case which motivated its drafting-that of the forces 





The expression "members of the regular armed force" denotes armed forces which 
differ from those referred to in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph[llII] in one respect 
only: the authority to which they profess allegiance is not recognized by the adversary 
as a Party to the conflict. These "regular armed forces" have all the material 
characteristics of armed forces in the sense of subparagraph 0 ): they wear uniform[s], 
they have an organized hierarchy and they know and respect the laws and customs of 
war. The ddegates to the 1949 Diplomatic Conference were therefore fully justified in 
considering that there was no need to specify for such armed fo rces the requirements 
stated in subparagraphs (2) (a), (b), (cl, and (d).[o 9] 
The distinguishing feature of such armed forces is simply the fact that in view of their 
adversary, they were not operating or are no longer operating under the direct 
authori tyofa Party to the conflict in accordance with Article 2 of the Convention. [ 140] 
One solution in order to bring these armed forces legally within the scope of the 
Convention was to associate them with a belligerent fighting against the Power 
concerned. During the Second World War the German authorities accepted this 
solution and stated they would consider the Free French Forces to be "fighting for 
England". The conference of Government Experts also supported this solution. [l ~1 J 
Another procedure which was proposed by the [ICRC] was that the forces should be 
recognized provided they were constituted in a regular manner "irrespective of the 
Government or authority under whose orders they might claim to be." In order to 
preclude any abusive interpretation which might have led to the fo rmation of armed 
bands such as the "Great Companies" of baneful memory,[ 1~ 2] the drafters of the 1949 
Convention specified that such armed forces must "profess allegiance to a Government 
or authority not recognized by the Detaining Power." It must be expressly stated that 
this Government or authority must. as a minimum requirement. be recognized by 
third States. but this condition is consistent with the spirit of the provision. which was 
founded on the specific case of the forces of General de Gaulle. 
It is also necessary that this authority, which was not recognized by the adversary, 
should either consider itself as representing one of the High Contracting Parties, or 
declare that it accepts the obligations stipulated in the Convention and wishes to apply 
them . I ~3 
The Taliban did not meet the criteria contained in Article 4A(3) inasmuch as it 
was never the de jure government of Afghanistan. Throughout the Taliban era and 
the period in question. the government of Afghanistan recognized by the United 
Nations. the United States and by all nations other than Pakistan. Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates was that of Burhanuddin Rabbani. l44 His regime retained 
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"title" to the Afghanistan seat in the United Nations throughout the ensuing events 
in Afghanistan set forth in this article. As previously noted, Saudi Arabia, the UAE 
and Pakistan withdrew their recognition of the Taliban as the United States and its 
coalition partners commenced military operations in Afghanistan. 
A distinction exists between the "Free French" case as envisioned by Article 
4A(3), GPW, and the situation in Afghanistan. For Article4A(3) to have applied to 
captured Taliban, the Taliban at some point wowd have had to have been the de 
jure government of Afghanistan, a status it never achieved. 
Article 4A(6) 
Article 2 of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV entitled citizens "who, on 
the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up anns to resist the invading 
troops without having had time to organize themselves" into regwar armed forces 
to status as a levee etI masse and to prisoner of war status if captured provided its 
members "carried their arms openly" and respected the law of war. Article 4A(6), 
GPW, reconfirmed the Hague provision, though Pictet acknowledges that a levee 
en masse "almost never occurred during the Second World War."145 Entitlement 
to levee en masse exists only in territory not under enemy occupation. Pictet also 
notes that a levee en masse "can only be considered to exist during a very short pe-
riod of time, that is, during the actual invasion period."146 Thereafter, such indi-
viduals are entitled to prisoner of war status only if they meet the six criteria in 
Article 4A(2), GPW.147 
The Taliban, however loosely structured, was an armed faction engaged in a 
civil war with other warlords or factions. Its resistance to the initial US/coalition as-
sawt would not have been a spontaneous, informal taking up of arms by individual 
private citizens of the sort contemplated by the language either of the 1907 Hague 
Convention or the 1949 GPW. 
Special Operations Forces in Non-Standard Uniforms 
Entry of US and allied SOP into Afghanistan in October 200 1 brought to the fore 
the law of war issue of dress of some SOF in indigenous attire. It is a matter this au-
thor examined at length,1411 but which by necessity must be addressed briefly here. 
In addition to the legal issue as such, it exposes an inconsistency in the Bush ad-
ministration's arguments for denial of prisoner of war status to captured Taliban. 
US and allied SOP were members of the regwar forces of their nations and, con-
sistent with Article 4A(I), GPW, entitled to prisoner of war status if captured by 
military forces of an enemy nation. The entitlement to prisoner of war status of in-
dividuals who fall within Article 4A(i ) is absolute; it is not conditional, as is the 
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case with militia and organized resistance endeavoring to gain prisoner of war enti-
tlement under Article 4A(2), GPW.149 
As noted, governments involved in drafting the 1949 GPW were fully cognizant 
ofthe World War II resistance experience. It was the basis for broadening the pro-
tection contained in Article I, Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV and Arti-
cle I, paragraph I, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War of July 27, 1929,150 to include members of State-sponsored organized resis-
tance movements as individuals entitled to prisoner of war status provided they 
met the four criteria contained in each of those treaties and in Article 4A(2) of the 
1949 GPW. Had governments in 1899, 1907, 1929 or 1949 regarded the wearing of 
a uniform a prerequisite for captured regular forces' entitlement to prisoner of 
war status, it would not have been difficult to have said so. They did not. 151 That 
said, a general asswnption exists that members of a State's armed forces (as that 
term is used in the GPW), including SOF, will meet the four criteria contained in 
Article 4A(2) in their operations. In practical terms, this has been accomplished by 
regular forces, including SOF.IS2 
A distinction exists, however, between the requirement in Article 4A(2)(b) to 
have a "fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance" and an assumption that 
regular forces, including SOF, must wear full uniforms in order to remain entitled 
to prisoner of war status. This distinction is not supported by treaty text or State 
practice, as this author has shown. lS3 
Several problems arise with an assumption that uniforms are required for enti-
tlement to prisoner of war status: (a) no such requirement exists in the 1899 
Hague Convention II, 1907 Hague Convention IV, 1929 GPW, nor in the 1949 
GPW; (b) the term "uniform" is not used in any ofthese treaties;l S4 (c) "uniform" 
is undefined in the law ofwar;I ;; and (d) requiring SOF to wear a complete uni-
form would impose upon them a higher standard than that imposed upon mem-
bers of an organized resistance movement entitled to prisoner of war status under 
Article 4A(2), GPW. 
The issue was clarified in the diplomatic history of the 1974-77 diplomatic con-
ference that produced the 1977 Additional Protocol I and II. The criteria for com-
batant and prisoner of war status were re1axed in Articles 43( 1) and 44 (3), for non-
State actors in conflicts ofthe type defined in Article 1(4). As neither the United 
States nor Afghanistan is a party to Additional Protocols I and II, these provisions 
are not directly germane to the issue at hand. However, Article44(7) and its legisla-
tive history are. Article 44(7) states "[t ]his Article is not intended to change the 
generally accepted practice of States with respect to the wearing of the uniform by 
combatants assigned to the regular, uniformed armed units of a Party to the 
conflict." 
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An authori tative commentary on this provision, prepared by individuals di-
rectly involved in its drafting and negotiation, explains the meaning of this 
provision: 
Within the Working Group the initial enthusiasm for a single standard applicable both 
to regular and independent armed forces was dampened when concern was expressed 
that the [new] rules . .. might encourage uniformed regular forces to dress in civilian 
clothing. . . . Accordingly, para. 7 was developed to [overcome this concern] .. . . The 
report of the Working Group, however, states that "regulars who are assigned to tasks 
where they must wear civilian clothes, as may be the case ... with advisers assigned to 
certain resistance units, are not required to wear the uniform." The implication of para. 
7, construed in the light of the Working Group report is that uniforms continue to be 
the principal means by which members of regular uniformed units distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population ... but that members of regular armed forces 
assigned or attached to duty with the forces of resistance or liberation movements may 
conform to the manner in which such irregulars conform to the requirements of para. 3.156 
The situation US and other coalition SOF faced upon entry into Afghanistan 
was not new. Special operations forces working with indigenous resistance forces 
frequently find themselves singled out as high-value targets by opposing forces. IS? 
With the precedent of the consequences of the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, following 
which US fo rces were withdrawn from Somalia, and fearing a similar withdrawal in 
the event of US casualties, Northern Alliance warlords insisted on US and other 
SOP wearing indigenous attire in the opening phase of operations against al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban so they would blend in with the forces with whom they served. 1$8 
O pposing sides generally had no difficulty identifying one another as fighters.ls9 
The issue at hand with respect to al-Qaeda, the Taliban and coalition SOF in 
Northern Alliance dress was twofold: first, whether they met any of the criteria in 
Article 4, GPW, for entitlement to prisoner of war status, and second, if they were 
lawful combatants, whether they engaged in " treacherous killing," prohibited by 
Article 23(e), Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV,I60 and otherwise referred 
to as perfidy. In the case at hand the prohibition on perfidy is defined in part in Arti-
cle 37,1977 Additional Protocol I, as follows: 
1. It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts 
inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or 
is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The 
following acts are examples of perfidy: 
(c) the feigning of civilian or non-combatant status .. . 161 
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With the exception of acts by individual members of al-Qaeda or the Taliban, 
perfidy was not an issue in the course of the operations during the time frame in 
question. As noted, both sides readily identified opposing forces. 
President Bush's Decision 
On February 7, 2002, President George W. Bush signed a memorandum to the Vice 
President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Director of 
Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others concerning 
humane treatment of a1 Qaeda and Taliban detainees. 162 The memorandum, by ac-
knowledgment based upon a legal opinion rendered by the Attorney General, 
concluded: 
1. None of the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions apply to "our 
conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world 
because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting 
Party." 
2. While the Attorney General advised the President that he has the 
constitutional authority to "suspend [sic] Geneva as between the United 
States and Afghanistan," President Bush declined to do so with respect to 
the conflict with the Taliban. 
3. The conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban was an international armed 
conflict in which Common Article 3 to the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions (non-international armed conflicts) did not apply. 
4. Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants. Neither Taliban nor al-
Qaeda detainees are entitled to prisoner of war status. 
5. Detainees will be treated "humanely and, to the extent appropriate and 
consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the 
principles of Geneva." 
The President's decision was preceded by considerable interagency debate, pri-
marily between the Departments of Justice and State. 163 Professors Goldman, 
Tittemore and Toman provide analyses of the President's decision and details of 
the views taken within the executive branch to the extent they were available at the 
time each article was written.l64 The details of the debate are worthy of separate 
analysis beyond the scope of this article and, moreover, have been resolved more by 
decisions of the US Supreme Court since February 7, 2002, than by the President's 
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February 7 memorandum.16s It is sufficient to note that the Department of Justice 
and the Attorney General aggressively sought suspension of the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, while the Secretary of State argued for a decision consistent with long-
standing US practice of providing humane t reatment to individuals captured on 
the battlefield consistent with the GPW, even where an individual's precise status 
may not always be clear. 166 
In the debate between the Departments of Justice and State over the law of war 
status of captured Taliban, disagreements over facts played a large role. When J us-
tice Department officials offered as one option the conclusion that Afghanistan 
was a failed State,I67 Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's response did not disagree, 
but contained an attachment with a diplomatically obscure and factually evasive 
rebuttal that "any determination that Afghanistan is a failed State would be con-
trary to the official US government position. The United States and the interna-
tional community have consistently held Afghanistan to its treaty obligations and 
identified it as a party to the Geneva Conventions."I6/! Similarly, White House 
Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales argued that "[tJhe argument that the United States 
has never determined that GPW did not apply is incorrect. In at least one case 
(Panama in 1989) the United States determined that GPW did not apply even 
though it determined for policy reasons to adhere to the convention ."I69 This as-
sertion was incorrect as the US position during Operation Just Cause was that Arti-
cle 3 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions applied at a minimum. 
Panamanian Defense Forces captured during Operation Just Cause were provided 
prisoner of war protections pending for mal determination by individual Article 5, 
GPW, tribunals, if deemed necessary. 170 
A memorandum prepared by the late Edward R. Cummings, a senior and highly 
respected Department of State lawyer with extensive law of war experience, notes 
that his consultations determined that "[tJhe lawyers involved [Departments of 
Justice, State, and Defense, White House Counsel, Office of the Vice President, and 
Legal Counsel to the Chairman, loint Chiefs] all agree that al Qaeda or Taliban sol-
diers are presumptively not POWs [prisoners ofwarJ."171 However, it emphasized 
that Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of State 
lawyers believe that, in the unlikely event that "doubt should arise" as to whether a 
particular detainee does not qualify for POW status, we should be prepared to offer 
additional screening on a case-by-case basis, either pursuant to Article 5 ofGPW (to the 
extent the convention applies) or consistent with Article 5 (to the extent it does not).172 
The memorandum notes that lawyers at the Department of Justice, White House 
Counsel and Office of the Vice President did not agree. 
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The President's decision attempted to split the difference, but in a way that was 
less politically and legally defensible than had the law been strictly applied, as has 
been the long-standing practice of the United States in armed conflicts in which 
captured enemy personnel may not have met the criteria contained in Article 4, 
GPW, for entitlement to prisoner of war status. 
Public statements offering a rationale for President Bush's decision contained a 
flawed law of war analysis. On February 7, 2002, the following White House an-
nouncement explained the legal basis for President Bush's decision: 
The President has determined that the Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban 
detainees, but not to the al Qaeda detainees. 
Al Qaeda is not a state party to the Geneva Convention; it is a foreign terrorist group. 
As such, its members are not entitled to POW status. 
Although we never recognized the Taliban as the legitimate Mghan government, 
Mghanistan is a party to the Convention, and the President has determined that the 
Taliban are covered by the Convention. Under the terms of the Geneva Convention, 
however, the Taliban detainees do not qualify as POWs. 
Therefore, neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda detainees are entitled to POW status. 173 
At a White House press briefing that same day, White House Press Secretary Ari 
Fleischer stated: 
[TJhe national security team . .. has a1way& said that these detainees should not be 
treated as prisoners of war, because they don't conform to the requirements of Article 4 
of the Geneva Convention, which detailed what type of treatment would be given to 
people in accordance with POW standards. That's a very easily understood legal 
doctrine of Article 4. For example, the detainees in Guantanamo did not wear 
uniforms. They're not visibly identifiable. They don't belong to a military hierarchy. 
All of those are prerequisites under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention, which will be 
required in order to determine somebody is a POWP' 
The following day Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld repeated 
Fleischman's comment, stating the GPW "requires soldiers to wear uniforms that 
distinguish them from the civilian population."17S Continuing, he stated, "The 
Taliban did not wear distinctive signs, insignias, symbols or uniforms. To the con-
trary, far from seeking to distinguish themselves from the civilian population of 
Afghanistan, they sought to blend in with civilian non-combatants, hiding in 
mosques and populated areas."176 
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The Fleischer and Rumsfeld statements contain two fundamental discrepancies. 
First, each fails to articulate the primary threshold for entitlement to prisoner of 
war status: al-Qaeda and the Taliban were private armed groups lacking any autho-
rization or support from a State party to the armed conflict. Failing this, the four 
criteria cited by Fleischer and Rumsfeld are not relevant; they and the balance of 
the GPW do not apply to al-Qaeda, the Taliban or any other armed private group. 
As explained, the concept of right authority dates back more than eight centuries; it 
is expressly stated in Article 4A(2), GPW; yet it is missing from the Gonzales mem-
orandum to President Bush, the Bush memorandum, and the Fleischer and 
Rumsfeld statements. The key element (righ t autllOrity) was completely missed or 
ignored in the official decision-making process and explanations of the Bush 
administration. 
Second, emphasis on captured al-Qaeda and Taliban not wearing a "uniform" 
not only was factually incorrect, but ignored the fact that US forces fought along-
side anti-Taliban forces who also did not wear a "uniform" in the Western Euro-
pean tradition. 171 Moreover, the term "uniform" is not the prerequisite in Article 
4A(2), GPW, which is "having a flXed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance." 
As previously noted, "uniform" is neither used nor defined in the relevant law of 
war treatiesYs The distinctive apparel worn by Taliban and anti-Taliban forces 
and, in the case of the latter, by some US special operations forces working with 
them, met the "distinctive sign recognizable at a distance" test contained in Article 
4A (2).179 
Finally, in emphasizing the erroneous "uniform" test while ignoring the "orga-
nized resistance movement of a Party to the conflict" requirement, Fleischer and 
Rumsfeld not only ran afoul of the treaty provision but appeared to suggest that al-
Qaeda and the Taliban represented the government of Afghanistan, contrary to the 
President's decision that "[ bIY its terms, Geneva applies to conflicts involving 
'High Contracting Parties,' which can only be states." This inconsistency was not 
missed by critics of the administration's approach to law of war application with 
respect to captured members of these two organizations. 180 Whether one agrees or 
disagrees with President Bush's decision, these statements were an incredible 
stumble given the degree to which this issue was discussed within the executive 
branch prior to the President's February 7 decision. 
President Bush's principal conclusion that neither al-Qaeda nor the Taliban was 
entitled to combatant or prisoner of war status was legally correct, but its support-
ing statements were contradictory and factually and legally incorrect, as follows: 
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Bush administration rat ionale for denial Factual or legal discrepancy, or contradic-
of prisoner of war status to captured al- tory statements or act ions by the Bush 
Qaeda and Taliban administration 
"The President has determined that the Legally incorrect and contradictory. As 
[GPW [ applies to the Taliban detainees, but noted in subsequent statements and the six 
not to the al-Qaida detainees.~L" conditions contained in Article 4A(2 ), 
"[Tjhe President has determined that the GPW, captured Taliban were not entitled to prisoner of war status. Therefore GPW did 
Taliban are covered by the [GPW] .... not apply to Taliban detainees. [H]owever, the Taliban detainees do not 
qualify as POWs. ~I " Inconsistent with the President's statement 
that "[b ]y its terms, [GPW] applies to con-
flicts involving 'High Contracting Parties,' 
which can only be states." 
Inconsistent with statement 3 (below). 
US followed GPW asa manero(policy in 
pasl conflicts where status of captured indi-
viduals was undetermined. The Bush ad-
ministration did not continue this practice, 
resisting application of Common Article 3 
humane treatment provisions until man-
dated by US Supreme Court. '" 
U AI Qaeda is not a High Contracting Legally vague and inaccurate. It would have 
Party.~I" been more accurate to say "al.Qaeda is a 
uAI Qaeda is not a state party to the [GPW]; private armed group that meets none of the 
it is a foreign terrorist group. As such, its 
GPW categories for POW status." 
members are not entitled to POW status. ~I", 
uUnder the terms ofthe [GPW], neither the Inconsistent with first statement (above) 
Taliban nor al·Qaida detainees are entitled that "GPW applies to Taliban detainees." 
to POW status.~'· GPW applies to captured individuals who 
meet one of the categories contained in AI-
tide 4. If captured personnel do not fall 
~in one of those categories, GPW is le-
y inapplicable. 
"We never recognized the Taliban as the le- Contradictory statements. 
gi timate Afghan government."'" 
The first implies thai the Taliban was the de 
"The Taliban was not the government of jure government. The second contradicts 
Afghanistan."'· the first. 
First statement is not supported factually. 
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Bush administra tion rat ionale for denial Factual o r legal d iscrepancy, o r contradic-
of prisoner of war status to captured al- tory statements o r act ions by the Bush 
Qaeda and Taliban administration 
Captured al-Qaeda and Taliban «did not Asswning reference by each was to Article 
wear uniforms. They' re not easily 4A(2), GPW, there is no requirement to 
identifiable."'" wear uniform, but to wear "a fixed distinc-
GPW "requires soldiers to wear unifonns 
tive sign recognizable at a distance." 
that distinguish them from the civilian pop- ~Distinctive sign" one of six requirements 
ulation. The Taliban did not wear diSlinc- in Article 4A(2), GPW, all of which must be 
tive signs, insignias. symbols, or met. 
uniforms."'" 
Factually incorrect: SOF reported both al-
Qaeda and Taliban wore distinctive attire 
and by and large were easily identifiable 
when assembled as fighting units.'" 
US/coalition SOF worked with and wore in-
digenous (Northern Alliance) attire that 
met the "distinctive sign" criteria. 
Hypocritical to emphasize «failure to wear 
unifonn" as the basis for denial of POW 
status when coalition forces were similarly 
attired in non-standard (Northern Alliance) 
unifonns. 
Al-Qaeda and Taliban "don't belong to a Statement is factually incorrect, ambiguous, 
military hierarchy."'" incomplete. 
Taliban had tribal hierarchy. GPW estab-
lishes no specific organizational criteria. 
Statement fails to emphasize that there are 
six criteria in Article 4A(2), GPW, each of 
which must be met for entitlement to POW 
status. 
Taliban hid in mosques. '" Taking up position in a mosque is not a vi-
olation of the law of war. It may result in 
the mosque relinquishing its nonnal status 
as a civilian object and becoming a military 
objective,'" but is not necessarily a law of 
war violation or a basis for denial of pris-
oner of war status. 
Conclusions and Lessons to Be u arned 
This author's remit was to examine the issue of al-Qaeda and the Taliban entitle-
ment to combatant and prisoner of war status. As concluded herein, neither al-
Qaeda nor the Taliban were entitled to lawful combatant or prisoner of war status. 
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The author believes the paper would be incomplete if it did not identify lessons 
to be learned from the actions taken by the Bush administration and others with re-
spect to this process. Several conclusions or lessons may be drawn from the situa-
tion as it existed and the decision-making process related to the law of war status of 
al-Qaeda and Taliban captured in Afghanistan between the beginning ofUS/coali-
tion offensive operations in October 2001 and President George W. Bush's deci-
sion memorandum of February 7, 2002: 
• President George W. Bush was legally correct in concluding that neither al-
Qaeda nor the Taliban met the prerequisites for prisoner of war status, but for the 
wrong reasons. 
• Both al-Qaeda and the Taliban were private armed groups. Neither 
operated as an agent of a government. As such, both groups lacked right 
QlItllOrity. the centuries-old prerequisite for entitlement to lawful 
combatant and prisoner of war status that is continued in the 1949 Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. This point was 
completely overlooked or ignored in the Bush administration's rationale for 
denial of prisoner of war status to captured al-Qaeda and Taliban. 
• The Taliban was one faction in a civil war in a failed State. It had 
achieved neither status nor international recognition as the de facto or de 
jure government of Afghanistan. As was the case with captured al-Qaeda, 
Taliban fighters did not meet any of the categories within Article 4, GPW, 
for entitlement to prisoner of war status. 
• The Bush administration rationale for denial of prisoner of war status 
to captured Taliban was fundamen tally flawed in its focus exclusively on the 
last four criteria of the six criteria contained in Article 4A(2), GPW, and 
inconsistent given US active support of and alliance with Northern Alliance 
forces that did not meet the same four criteria. 
Arguments by administration officials to "suspend" or minimize GPW 
application, and language used to accomplish this in the administration's 
rationalization for denial of prisoner of war status, ignored the historic leadership 
the United States has exercised in law of war application in general and in 
providing humane treatment for captured personnel, even those not entitled to 
prisoner of war status. 
• The law of war is a highly esoteric subject. It requires careful research, 
reading and understanding of treaty texts, their diplomatic history and State 
practice, rather than cursory reading and selective use of treaty phrases in a 
manner inconsistent with their meaning. No competent lawyer would cite a case 
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without reading it in its entirety nor would he or she cite to a court a statutory 
provision without researching its law of war history. Making decisions related to 
law of war issues requires the same level of research, diligence and competence. 
This was not manifested in administration documents related to the 
determination of the status of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 
o The flawed arguments offered in support of the President's February 7, 2002 
decision were politically based rather than based on the law. They ignored the fact 
that the 1949 Geneva Conventions were submitted to the Senate for its advice and 
consent to ratification bya Republican president who, as a military officer, led the 
Allied campaign to victory against Germany in World War II; that the 1949 
Geneva Conventions have been applied in every armed conflict since their 
ratification without hesitation by successive administrations (four Republican 
and four Democrat), even where questions existed as to their formal application, 
because of US leadership in applying the law of war; and that these decisions did 
not hinder US military operations or place national security at risk. 
o While his decision on the key point may have been correct, President Bush 
erred in accepting the advice of individuals who lacked military experience and in-
depth knowledge of the law of war, but possessed skepticism, if not disdain, for the 
law of war, over that of individuals with military, combat and substantial law of 
war expertise and experience. This error affected the credibility of the decision 
and damaged the public diplomacy aspect of fighting the transnational terrorist 
threat posed by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups associated with it. 
o The executive branch possesses the subject-matter expertise capable of 
producing a legally accurate, credible and correct document to explain the 
rationale for denial of lawful combatant and prisoner of war status to private 
armed groups like al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The unnecessarily secretive decision-
making process leading up to the President 's February 7, 2002 memorandum 
failed to utilize the expertise available to it, to its detriment. 
o The assertion of "universal applicability" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
(by virtue of their ratification or accession by all governments) is in sharp conflict 
with the significant failure of their application and implementation by the 
majority of State parties. The fundamental inconsistency of Afghanistan's tribal 
warfighting culture and history of abuse of innocent civilians and persons hors de 
combat with the law of war should have been apparent to and recognized by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross in eliciting Afghanistan's ratification of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and by the government of Switzerland, as the 
depositary of the Geneva Conventions, in accepting Afghanistan's instrument of 
ratification or accession. Law of war treaty ratification should be a matter of 
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quality of and capability for implementation, respect and adherence, rather than 
mere quantity of State parties. "Universal applicability" means nothing if there is 
not universal application. 
• Afghanistan's cultural history does not relieve it of its treaty obligations. If 
the law of war is to have any relevance, State parties must be held accountable for 
their fai lures to take steps beyond merely being a name on the list to implement 
them. 
• If the International Committee of the Red Cross is to maintain its claim as 
the "guardian of the Geneva Conventions," it must do more to gain "universal 
application" of law of war treaties to which each State is a party. 
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support to the Taliban and the foreign figh ters in al-Qaeda were the same ones that had 
supported the mujahidin a decade before in the US-backed fight against the Soviet 
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GREATTOTHE FALLOFTHE TALIBAN 243 (2002), states: ~The Soviet invasion achieved tha t rarity 
in Afghanistan history: a unifying sense of political purpose that cut across tribal, ethnic, 
geographic. and economic lines.» On the concept in genera], see SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at 
154; FARWELL, supra note 11, at 5, 47, 153-54. On Afghanistan and its history, see SHULrL. & 
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ascendant Taliban regime. However, Gen. Dostum was betrayed by one of his own 
commanders, who sided with the Taliban. The general fled to Turkey in fear for his life. 
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doctrine and analysis was of no help in analyzing or fighting the asymmetrica1 guerrilla tactics of 
a traditional tribal culture" (s upra note 7, at 149) applies equally well to the US Army in the 
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flict that began in 2003, see JOHN A. NAGL, COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS FROM MALAYA AND 
VIETNAM: LEARNING TO EAT SOUP WITH A SPOON (2002). The new doctrine is contained in 
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32. RAsHID, supra note 11, at 9-10; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AFGHANISTAN: THE FOR· 
GOrrEN WAR, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND VIOLATIONS OFTHE LAW OF WAR SINCE SOVIET 
WITHDRAWAL (1991 ). LOYN, supra note II, at 114, observes: 
Of all of the foreign attempts to control Afghanistan in the two centuries after [British 
envoy Mounstuart l Elphinstone's first meeting in 1808, the Soviet invasion in 1979 was 
the one that came closest to success. And when the Soviet-backed government finally 
crumbled, the disunity of the forces tha t had ousted it flared into open civil war. Power 
had spun out of Kabul, and could not be drawn back. In Afghanistan imposing power 
from the center has always been temporary-like gathering together sand or water-
since local loyalty outweighs any other. 
See also SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at 179-80; COLL, supra note II, at 262-63. 
33. LoYN, supra note I I, at 211-46, 253-54. In the 1994 battle for Kabul, Najibul lah was 
forcibly taken by the Taliban from the United Nations compound in Kabul where he sought asy· 
lum in 1972. He and his brother were tortured and castra ted before being hanged. BRISCOE lIT 
A1.., supra note 8, at 95; COLL, suprll note I I, at 333; HOLT, supra note II, at 44. 
34. Rabbani remained the recognized ruler of Afghanistan, entitled to Afghanistan's seat in 
the United Nations d uring the Taliban period. He fonnally handed over power to an interim 
government headed by Hamid Karzai on December 22, 2001. See Burhanuddin Rabbani, 
GLOBAI.5ECURITI .ORG, hup:llglobaisecurity.orglmilitary/worldJafghanistan/rabbani.htm (last 
visited Feb. 27). RASHID, supra note II, at 10, observes: 
Afghanistan was in a stale of virtual disintegration just before the Taliban emerged at 
the end of 1994. The country was divided into warlord fiefdoms and all the warlords 
had fought, switched sides and fought again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals 
and bloodshed. The predominantly Tajik government of President Burhanuddin 
Rabbani controUed Kabul, its environs and the north-east of the country, while three 
provinces in the west centring on Herat were controUed by Ismael Khan. In the east on 
the Pakistan border three Pashtun provinces were under the independent control of a 
councilor Shura (Council) of Mujaheddin commanders based in Jalalabad. A small 
region to the south and east of Kabul was controlled by Gulbuddin Hikmetyar. 
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In the north the Uzbek warlord General Rashid Dostum held sway over six provinces 
and in January 1994 he had abandoned his alliance with the Rabbani government and 
joined with Hikmetyar to attack KabuL In central Afghanistan the Hazaras controlled 
the province ofBamiyan. Southern Afghanistan and Kandahar were divided up amongst 
dozens of petty ex-Mujaheddin warlords and bandits who plundered the population at 
will. With the tribal structu re and the economy in tatters, no consensus on a Pashtun 
leadership and Pakistan's unwill ingness to provide military aid to the Durranis as they 
did to Hikmetyar, the Pashtuns in the south were at war with each other. 
35. RAsHID, supra note II, at 90-92. See also SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at 180-81. 
36. SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at 86, 208, 235-36. Not all Taliban were Pashtun, nor were 
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Pashtun. Dr. Stephen Biddle's excellent study of Operation Enduring Freedom identified three 
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predominantly foreign al-Qaeda and (c) non-al-Qaeda foreign allies of the Taliban. BIDDLE, supra 
note 8, at 13. For law of war purposes and as will be explained, only two categories existed: al· 
Qaeda and Taliban, and in cases where al-Qaeda served with or led Taliban elements, arguably 
only one. 
37. SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at 238. 
38. Id. at 236. 
39. LOYN, supra note 11, at 239 [emphasis provided]. In this regard, see the quotation from 
LEWIS, supra note 17. 
40. RAsHID, supra note 11, at 39, 53, 59. Dr. Biddle notes, ~The Afghan Taliban were often 
poorly trained soldiers. Many had little or no formal military instruction, and Afghan ranks 
swelled and shrank with the seasons and the fortunes of war as troops went home to their villages 
or took up anns depending on the crop cycle and apparent military need." BIDDLE, supra note 8, 
at 15. See also Anon., supra note 15, at 36: 
Few of the factional commanders, at any level, possessed any experience in the conduct 
of large coordinated offensives. Most were extremely proficient at perfonning small· 
uni t actions. But combining their forces (three separate and distinct major formations 
and numerous subordinate commands) into a coordinated offensive under one major 
fonnation was clearly uncharted territory and a distinct challenge. 
On the Afghan practice of switching sides, the article continues: 
The Afghan tradition of surrender and transfer of loyalty is not unlike what the US 
experienced during the Civil War (1861-65], with prisoner exchanges, paroles and 
pardons. The Afghans, in keeping with their custom, expect soldiers who have 
surrendered to abide by the conditions of their surrender agreement and to behave 
honorably. But the vast numbers of Arabs, Pakistanis, Chechens, Uighers and other 
foreign nationals who were members of al-Qaeda ignored the Afghan custom. They 
used individual surrenders as a means of furthering their cause, often creating 
treacherous conditions. 
Id. at 38. 
41. SHULrl & DEW, supra note 7, at 253. 
42. RAsHID, supra note 11, at 52-53. 
43. Id. at 54. 
44. COll, supra note 11, at 349. 
45. Id. 
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46. Id. al 475-76; LOYN, supra nOle II, aI259-62; RAsHID, supra nOle II, al 26, 28-29, 39, 
44-45, 52-53; SCHEUER, supra nOIe 7, at III, 113. 
47. COLl, supra nOle II, at 349. 
48. Id. at 445-46 comments on the ra tionale for UAf recognition: 
One of the most passionate hunters was Sheikh Khal ifa bin Zayed al-Nahayan, the 
billionaire crown prince of Abu Dhabi in the Uni ted Arab Emirates . ... Scores of 
equally rich U.A. E. notables flew to Pakistan each season to hunt. So entrenched did the 
alliance wilh Pakistan around houbara hunts become that the Pakistani air force agreed 
secretly to lease one of its northern air bases to the [UAE] so that the sheikhs could more 
conveniently stage the aircraft and supplies required for their hunts. Pakistani 
personnel maintained the air base, but the U.A.E. paid for its upkeep. They flew in and 
out on C-130s and on smaller planes that could reach remote hunting grounds. 
Some of the best winter houbara grounds were in Afghanistan. Pakistani politicians had 
hosted Arab hunting trips there since the mid-199Qs. They had introduced wealthy 
sheikhs to the leadership of the Taliban, creating connections for future finance of the 
Islamist militia. Bin Laden circulated in this Afghan hunting world after he arrived in 
the country in 1996. So the CIA report that he had joined a large, stationary camp in 
western Afghanistan that winter seemed consistent wi th previous reporting about bin 
laden. 
The UAE'sAfghanistan western hunting camp played a keypart in ta rget selection forthe August 
20, 1998 US cruise· missile strike against al -Qaeda training camps in response 10 the al ·Qaeda 
attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, discussed infra. Despite its 
relationship with the Tal iban, the UAE royal family was cooperative with US planners in 
providing information to facilitate identification of the royal family western Afghan hunting 
camp, while disavowing its use by al -Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden. Id. al 448-49. 
49. RAsHID, supra note II, at 251 n.4. 
50. BRISCOE ET At., supra note 8, at 21; LOYN, supra note II, at 257-58. 
51. BRISCOE ET AL., supra nOle 8, at 21. 
52. Id.; RAsHID, supra note II, at 5, 44-45, 52-53, 58, 61-63, 72-73, 80, 188-89; COll, supra 
note II, at 349. 
53. COLl, supra note II, at 350-51; see also RASHID, supra note 11, at 64-66. The principal 
pro· Taliban proponent wi thin the former Afghanistan embassy, Seraj Jamal, left Washington for 
New York to be the Taliban's unofficial (unrecognized) delegation at the Uni ted Nations; COLt., 
supra, at 351. 
54. The government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani continued 10 hold Afghanistan's 
Uniled Nalions seat dur ing the Taliban period. 
55. BRISCOE ET At.., supra note 8, at 95. 
56. RAsHID, supro note II,al64-74; LoYN, supra note 11, al 253-54; BRISCOE ET AL., supra 
note 8, at 22; HUMAN RlGHTS WATCH, AFGHANISTAN: THE MASSACRE IN MAZAR·I-SHARIF 
(1998). Taliban actions prompted European Union suspension of all humanitarian aid to areas 
of Afghanistan controlled by the Tal iban. RASHID, supra, al 72. The Hwnan Rights Watch report 
contains a minor error in interchangeably referring to Taliban conduct in Mazar-i-Sharif as acts 
of ureprisar or "revenge~ for Taliban losses in its unsuccessful 1997 battle for Mazar-i-Sharif. 
The terms are not synonymous, with the former having a very specific meaning in the lawof war. 
Although there may be questions as to whether the full range of protections against reprisal was 
applicable in Afghanistan's civil war, nonetheless the basic preconditions for executing reprisal 
did not exist. See FRITS KAlSHovEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISAlS 339-44 (1971) . The present au· 
thor has identified the following criteria for a reprisal: 
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1. A reprisal is an act which would be unlawful if not committed for the purpose of a 
reprisal 
2. It must be done for the purpose of compelling the other belligerent to observe the 
law of war. 
3. It must not be done before other means have been reasonably exhausted. 
4. It may be executed only on the express order of higher authority. 
5. It must be committed against persons or objects whose attack as a reprisal is not 
otherwise prohibited. 
6. It must be proportional to the original wrong. 
W. Hays Parks, A Few Tools in the Prosecution o!WarCrimes, 149 MILITARY L\W REVIEW 73, 84 
(1995). See also UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY Of DEFENCE, THE MANUAL Of THE L\W Of 
ARMED CONFUcr65, 5.18 and 418-19, 16.16, \6.17 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUALJ. As 
noted in this author's article, the tenn ureprisar often is misused when other tenns, such as 
Kretaliation," Uretorsion" or even ulawful attack of a militaryobjective,~ might be more accurate. 
In the case of Taliban conduct in 1998 in Mazar-i-Sharif, the substantial delay between anti-
Taliban forces in 1997's and Taliban actions does not suggest its actions were taken ufor the 
purpose of compelling the other belligerent to observe the law of war," but were more in line 
with tribal acts of revenge in blood feuds. See SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 11, at 157. In this 
respect Taliban actions manifest the distinction between a "soldier" and a "warrior" made by 
Professor Hugh Turney-High in his classic PRIMITIVE WAR 149-52 (1949) in describing the 
revenge mode of a warrior, a trait discussed in the context of Somalia and Afghanistan in SHULTZ 
& DEW, supra, at 5-7, 57-100, 147-95. 
57. RAsHID, supra note 11, at 75; BERNTSEN & PFZZUlO, supra note 8,at 1-27; COlL,supra 
note 11, at 403-05. 
58. COLL, supra note 11, at 411. 
59. LOYN, supra note 11, at 267. US State Department officials met with Taliban leader Mul-
lah Omar, requesting that he tum over Usama bin Laden. A quid pro quo of US recognition of the 
Taliban in return for the Taliban to tum bin Laden over to it did not materialize; COLL, supra 
note 11, at 430; BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 8, at 24. 
60. RAsHID, supra note 11, at 76; COLL, supra note II, at 548-49. 
61. S.c. Res. 1214, U.N. Doc. S/RES/l214 (Dec. 8,1998), discussed infra. 
62. RAsHID, supra note 11, at 77. UAf recognition had been token at best. As Rashid notes, 
following Saudi withdrawal from Afghanistan and its dealings wi th the Taliban, Pakistan re-
mained the Taliban's sole financial provider. Id. 
63. S.c. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19,2000); S.c. Res. 1363, U.N. Doc. SJRESJ 
1363 (July 30, 2001). 
64. Rashid reports: 
Not surprisingly, Iran, Turkey, India, Russia and four of the five Central Asian 
Republics-Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan-have backed the 
anti-Taliban Northern Alliance with anns and money to try and halt the Taliban's 
advance. In contrast Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have backed the Taliban . . . . The 
Taliban victories in northern Afghanistan in the summer of 1998 ... set in motion an 
even fiercer regional conflict as Iran threatened to invade Afghanistan and accused 
Pakistan of supporting the Taliban .... 
RASHID, supra note II, at 5. 
65. Id. at 80; COll, supra note II, at 513-15; Report of the Secretary-General on the human-
itarian implications of the measures imposed by the Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) 
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and 1333 (2000) on Afghanistan 2-8, U.N. Doc. 512001/695 (July 13, 2001). See also The 
situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the 
5ecretary-General4, 5-9, particularly, 25, U.N. Doc. N55/907-S/2001/384 (Apr. 19, 2001 ) (re-
porting on the Secretary-General's visit to South Asia), which refers to "fighting throughout Af· 
ghanistan," belying media assertions that the Taliban controlled as much as 80 percent of 
Afghanistan. So, too, does the Secretary-General's July 13, 2001 report, which states, "All regions 
ofthe country, with the exception of the southern [Pashtunl region, now include active conflict 
zones." Supra" 48. 
66. U.N. Doc. N55/907-S/2001/384, supra note 65; U.N. Doc. 5/2001/695, supra note 65. 
Within Afghanistan, the Taliban did not enjoy popular support. BIDDLE, supra note 8, at 16. 
Continuing, Dr. Biddle notes that the Taliban was (a) poorly trained, (b) had poor morale and 
(c) had a cultural willingness to defect. Id. at 13. 
67. See, e.g., S.c. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999), demanding that "the 
Taliban tum over Usama bin Laden without further delay to appropriate authorities in a country 
where he has been indicted," and further actions by UN members, which refer only to "the 
Taliban." See also S.c. Res. 1333, supra note 63, which refers to "areas of Afghanistan under the 
control of the Afghan faction known as Taliban, which also calls itself the Islamic Emirate of Af· 
ghanistan (hereinafter known as the Taliban?; S.c. Res. 1363, supra note 63, refers to "States 
bordering the territory of Afghanistan under Tal iban control." U.N. Doc. N55/907-S/2001!384, 
supra note 65, reporting on the Secretary-General's visit to South Asia and his meeting with 
Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil, refers to the Taliban only and not as the 
Taliban "regime," much less as the government of Afghanistan. 
68. S.c. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001 ). 
69. Northern Alliance warlords Dostum and Alia Mohammed renewed offensive operations 
one day later; BIDDLE, supra note 8, at 8-10. 
70. BRISCOE IT AL, supra note 8, at 188-89; FURY, supra note II, at 275. Biddle states tha t 
"{oln the night of December 6, Mullah Omar and the senior Taliban leadership fled the city 
(Kandahar] and went into hiding, ending Taliban rule in Afghanistan," then continues: 
Allied forces subsequently tracked a group of al Qaeda survivors thought to include 
Osama bin Laden to a series of redoubts in the White Mountains near Tora Bora. The 
redoubts were taken in a 16-day battle ending on December 17, but many al Qaeda 
defenders escaped death or capture and fled across the border into Pakistan. 
BIDDLE, supra note 8, at II. 
71. BRISCOE IT AL, supra note8, at 203-16;generaUy, SEAN NAYLOR, NOT A GooD DAY TO 
DIE (2005) and PETE BUBER, THE MISSION, THE MEN, AND ME 262-95 (2008), describing Op. 
eration Anaconda, March 2-13, 2002. Taliban restoration and resurgence and the present situa· 
tion in Afghanistan are beyond the scope of this article. As noted, this article considers the status 
of the Taliban from the time of commencement of US military operations on October 20, 2001, 
to February 7,2002, when President George W. Bush issued his memorandwn concerning the 
law of war status of captured al-Qaeda and Taliban. The issue of treatment of captured al-Qaeda 
and Taliban is the subject of separate articles in this volwne by Stephane Ojeda, Matthrw 
Waxman and Ryan Goodman. 
72. Captured aircraft, tanks and anti-aircraft rquipment had become inoperable due to the 
Taliban's inability to maintain them. In disbanding the PDPA anny, the Taliban also disbanded 
the PDPA units responsible for thrir maintenance and operation. BUBER, supra note 71, at 161 . 
73. David Loyn offers this foUowing anecdotr related to thr Taliban's Mullah Omar and his 
rrfusal to accept the basic obligations of UN membership: 
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The UN made an effort to engage wilh the new administration, taking a copy of the UN 
Charter translated into Pashtu to Kandahar to show the Taliban what it meant to be a 
country. An envoy went through it page by page, silting cross-legged on Ihe ground, as 
he was asked what it meant when it talked of "human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." But Mullah Omar 
refused to meet. the UN envoy then or at any other time. 
Lom, supra note 11, at 253. 
74. fd. at 22-23; seea/so IAN BROWNLIE, PRlNCIPLI'.S OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 66-67 
(1966). 
75. GoLDMAN & nTIEMORE, supra note 3, at 24 n.84. 
76. The Taliban was not alone in its failure to follow Ihe lawof war in Afghanistan's civil war, 
a point acknowledged by Colonel John M ulholland, 51h Special Forces Group commander, in 
advising his command that "[ n[o one [the Afghan warlords] here is clean." BRISCOE ET M., supra 
note 8, at 95. This demonstrates Ihis author's earlier point of a distinction between legal applica-
bility of law of war (reaties and application in fact. 
77. CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, I INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPIJED 
BY THE UNITED STATES 15S-59 (2d rev. ed. 1951). 
78. fd. at 159-60. 
79. fd. at 156-57. 
80. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to Hague Con-
vention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907,36 Stat. 
2227, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFIJCfS, supra note I, at 66 (emphasis provided) 
(hereinafter Hague IV Annex] . Seea/so WSA OPPENHEIM, II INTERNATIONAL LAW, DISPUTES, 
WAR AND NEUTRAIJTY 434--45, § 167 (Hersch Lauterpacht 00., 71h 00. 1952) [hereinafter 
LAUTERPACHT]. 
81. Hague IV Annex, supra note 80, art. 43. 
82. SPAIGHT, supra note 4, at 327; UK MANUAL, supra note 56, at 275,,. 11.3, states: 
To detennine whether a state of occupation exists, it is necessary to look at the area 
concerned and detennine whether two conditions are satisfied: first, that the former 
government has been rendered incapable of publicly exercising its authority in that 
area; and, secondly, that the occupying power is in a position to substi tute its own 
authority for Ihat of the former government. 
Applying by analogy this test to Ihe Taliban, while the Taliban may have physically occupied 
substantial areas of Afghanistan, persistent resistance to the Taliban-as acknowledged in UN 
reports-precluded it from meeting the second part of the test. The first part occurred through 
the meltdown of the PDPA between 1992 and 1994. The second part never took place. 
The challenge the Taliban faced has historical precedent. A Russian analysis of British failures 
in its Sa:ond Anglo-Afghan War concluded, "English commanders und erstood that they had 
not gained possession of all these strips of country over wh ich Ihe (roops had passed, but only of 
the actual ground on which their forces were encamped." LOYN, supra note 11, at 11 4. This was 
Ihe predicament the Taliban faced and suggests the media's failure to appreciate the distinction 
between physical presence and control sufficient to govern. 
83. Supra note 65. 
84. The present author may have contributed to Professor Toman's conclusion that the 
Taliban was the de facto government. As he notes in his article, supra note 3, in reply to an e-
mail from Professor Toman, the present author staled, U An argument might be made Ihat the 
Taliban was the de facto government of Afghanistan until early October 2001, as it occupied 80% 
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of Afghanistan.~ This infonnal response was based entirely on media reports, as the present au · 
thor had not been involved in Operation Enduring Freedom issues or had access to official reo 
ports or analyses. The addi tional information obtained in research for and presented in this 
article presents a substantially different and more accurate picture. 
Even were one to argue that at the time ofTaliban recognition by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE the Taliban was the de facto government, Professor Brownlie notes that "[ilt issometimes 
said that de jure recognition is irrevocable while de facto recognition can be withdrawn. ~ 
BROWNLIE, supra note 74, at 87. 
85. Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted in THE LAwS OF 
ARMED CONFllCfS, supra note I,at 507 [hereinafterGPW Convention]. This section is derived 
from W . H ays Parks, Jus in Bello in the Struggle against Terrorism, in LEGAL ISSUES IN THE STRUG· 
GLE: AGAINST TERROR (John Norton Moore & Robert Turner eds., forthcom ing). 
86. See U.S. v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 552-58 (E.D. Va. 2(02). 
87. The just war tradition is an historic articulation of wilen (jus ad bellum) it is justifiable for 
a State to resort to arms, and what (jus in bello) use of force is legally pennissible. See JAMES 
TuRNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR AND THE RFSfRAINTOF WAIl.. (1981). 
88. Gerald I.A.D. Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerrilln Warfare, 
BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 173, 176 (1971);Gerald lAD. Draper, The Pres-
ent UlW of Comootancy, in REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ARMED CONFllCfS: THE SELECTED 
WORKS ON THE LAwS OF WAR BY THE LATE PROFfSSQR COWNEL G.I.A.D. DRAPER, OBE 195 
(Michael A. Meyer & Hilaire McCoubrey eds., 1998). See also MAURICE H. KEEN, THE LAWS OF 
WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 13-15,69 et seq. (1965) . 
89. KEEN, supra note 88, at 50. 
90. The classic example is the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Aus· 
trian throne, by the Slav Gavrilo Princip, in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, generally regarded as the 
spark that ignited World War I. This principle is made clear in the US Constitu tion, which vests 
in the President of the Uni ted States the authority to act as commander in chief of US anned 
forces (Article II , § 2) and in the US Congress the authority to raise armies and navies and to de· 
clare war (Article I, § 8). 18 U.S.c. § 960 (2000) (Neutrali ty Act) makes it a criminal offense for a 
person within the United States to begin, set on foot, provide for or prepare "a means for or (fur. 
nish] the money for, or [take] part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise to becarried 
on .. . against the terri lOry or dominion of any foreign . . . state . . . with whom the United States is 
at peace . . . . " See, e.g., United States v. Stephen E. Black and Joe D. Hawkins, 685 F.2d 132 (5 th 
Cir. 1982), a case in which US citizens were convicted of violation of the Neutrality Act. A narra· 
tive history of the case is STf:WART BELL, BAYOU OF PIGS (2008). 
91. HYDE, supra note 77, at 1692, 1797; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 50, at 203-05. 
92. Additional Protocol I, supra note I, art. 51(3); Additional Protocol II, supra note I, art. 
13(3). 
93. Denial of quarter includes refusal to accept an offer to surrender and summaryexerution 
upon capture. 
94. Mosby's unit operated under a commission issued by the Governor of Virginia. State 
commissions were a practice common for Union and Confederate forces. Receipt and retention 
of a governor's commission were dependent upon a unit carrying out its operations in unifonn 
under a commander responsible for its actions, and compliance wi th the law of war. JEFFRY D. 
WERT, MOSBY'S RANGERS 62-63, 69-71, 76, 77-78, 124, lSI, IS7 (1990). 
95. MICHAEL FELLMAN, INSIDE WAR: THE GUERRIlLA CONFllCf IN MISSOURI DURING THE 
CIVIL WAR (1 989), describes Quantrill's actions and modus operandi. 
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96. See RICHARD HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW Of WAR 2- 16, 31-44, 56, 60 
(1983). A traditional term is unprivileged belligerent, meaning a private individual not entitled to 
the combatant's privilege. Other commonly used tenns are unprivileged combatant and unmwful 
combatant. The tenn adopted by the Bush administration--enemy combatant-was counter to 
its own arguments, as it incorrectly equated captured Taliban and al-Qaeda to lawful enemy 
combatants. The term "unlawful enemy combatant" is potentially misleading, as it suggests a 
member of regular military forces of a government may be denied prisoner of war status because 
he or she has acted in a manner inconsistent with the law of war or committed other criminal 
acts. In accordance with Article 85, GPW, a pre-capture offense does not provide a basis 10 deny 
prisoner of war status to an individual who meets any of the categories in Article 4. As was the 
case with many law of war decisions by Bush administration officials d uring the period in ques· 
tion, "enemy combatan t ~ was selected more for political purposes than for legal accuracy. 
97. As used in Article 3, Knoncombatants" refers to military medical personnel and chap. 
lains rather than civilians. 
98. Named for its sponsor, Russian delegate Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens ( 1845-1909). 
99. The debate was limited to a form of extended levte en masse following enemy occupa· 
tion. A private citizen who took up anns against his or her own government or against another 
government with which his or her nation was at peace remained an unprivileged combatant. 
100. FRITS KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING Of WAR 14 (1987). Professor 
Kalshoven notes that Klt lhis phrase, altho ugh formulated especially with a view 10 the thorny 
problem of armed resiSlance in occupied territory, has acquired a significance far exceeding that 
particular problem.~ Continuing, he says that '"lilt implies no more and no less than that, no 
matter what States may fail to agree upon, the conduct of warwill always be governed by existing 
principles of international law." 
101. THE LAwS Of ARMED CONFUCTS, supra note l, aI 70. Article 2 providing lawful combat· 
ant sta tus to members of a levee en masse was amended to require that its members carry their 
arms openly in addition to respecting the laws and cusloms o f war. 
102. SPAIGHT, supra note 4, at 37. 
103. See EARl F. ZIEMKE & MAGNA E. BAUER, MOSCOW TO STALINGRAD: DECISION IN THE 
EAsT 199-219, 252- 54, 330, 434-35 (rev. ed. 1985). 
104. Representative histories are HENRI MICHEL, THE SHADOW WAR: EUROPEAN 
RfSI STANCE, 1939-1945 (Richard Barry trans., 1972); MICHAEl R. D. FOOT, REsISTANCE: 
EUROPEAN REsISTANCE TO NAZISM, 1940-1945 ( 1977); J0RGEN HA'.STRUP, EUROPE ABLAZE 
(1978); DAVID STAfFORD, BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN REsISTANCE, 1940-1945 (\980), CHARLF.S 
CRUICKSHANK, S.O.E. IN THE FAR EAST (1983); WILLIAM MACKENZIE, THE SECRET HISTORY Of 
SOE: THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS ExECUTIVE, 1940-1945 (1948, 2000); FRANCIS B. MILLS, 
ROBERT MIllS & JOHN W. BRUNNER, OSS OPERATIONS IN CHINA (2002). The present author 
has identified organized resistance movements authorized by exiled governments and provided 
SOE and OSS assistance in Albania, Belgium, Burma, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Fin· 
land, France, Greece, Indo-China, Italy, Malaya, NOrway, Poland, Rumania, Serbia, Singapore, 
Sumatra, Thailand and Yugoslavia. 
105. Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.lA.S. 3362, 75 U.N.T.5. 31 , reprinted in THE L\WS Of 
ARMED CONFUcrs, supra note I, at 459. 
106. Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217, T.l.A.S. 3363, 75 U.N.T.5. 85, reprinted in THE L\WS Of 
ARMED CONFUcrs. supra note I, at 485. 
107. Supra note 85. 
108. Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516, T.lAS. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, reprinted in THE LAwS Of 
ARMED CONFUcrs. supra note I, at 575. 
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109. The absence of treaty protection for civilian medical facilities and transport and 
wounded, sick or shipwrecked civilians was corrected in the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II. 
See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note I, arts. 8-31; MICHAEL BoTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH 
& WALDEMARA. SOlF, NEW Rum FOR V[Cl"IMS OF ARMED CONFUCl"S 89-167 (1982) . 
110. In the United States, this includes activated reserve and National Guard forces. 
Ill. GPW Convention, supra note 85, art. 4A(2) (emphasis provided). 
112. COMMENTARY III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 
OF WAR 50 (Jean S. Pictel ed., 19(0) (hereinafter Pictet GPW]. 
113. Article 2 Common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions states in part: "(Tlhe present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or any other anned conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by 
one of them." "High Contracting Parties" means nations who are State parties to the Geneva 
Conventions. ~High Contracting Parties" distinguished between nations who had ratified or ac-
ceded to the Geneva Conventions and those who were not yet party to and bound by the Geneva 
Conventions. As all 194 nations are now parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, they have uni· 
versal applicability. As this author notes herein, applicability does not necessarily translate into 
application by State parties. 
Article 2 Common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions does not define war. It establishes 
the threshold for application of the four Conventions to, inter alia, ~aU cases of declared war or 
any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, 
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them." In contrast, the judgment in United 
States v. Willrelm von Leeb et al. (The High Command Case, XI TWC 485 (1948) defines war 
more broadly as "the exerting of violence by one state or politically organized body against 
another. In other words, it is the implementation of a political policy by means of violence." 
There are two points of significance to the current discussion. First, the authors of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, and particularly the prisoner of war convention, were very deliberate in 
declining to recognize combat operations by a government against a private, politically 
organized body such as the Taliban as an armed conflict in which the Geneva Conventions 
technically or formally applied. Second, ignorance of history by the Bush administration 
resulted in faulty analysis and justification for its actions with respect to captured Taliban and al· 
Qaeda. 
114. Prisoner of war entitlement for actions as a levee en masse cease followingenemyoccupa. 
tion. Article 4A(6), GPW, expressly states, "Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the 
approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having 
had time to form themselves into regular anned units, provided they carry their arms openly and 
respect the laws and customs of war." Thereafter members of a levee en masse cease to exist as 
such and must meet each of the six cri teria in Article 4A(2), GPW, to receive entitlement to pris· 
oner of war status. 
115. Pictet G PW, supra note 112, at 57, states, Hit is essential tha t there should be a de facto reo 
lationship between the resistance organization and the party (sic] to intemationallaw which is in 
a state of wac, but the existence of this relationship is sufficien t," commenting further that such a 
relationship "may be indicated by deliveries of equipment and supplies, as was frequently the 
case during the Second World War, between the Allies and the resistance networks in occupied 
territories." In addition to the general histories noted supra note 104, British and US sealift and 
airlift support to organized resistance movements in Axis-occupied nations is described in DA· 
VID HOWARTH, THE SHETLAND BUS (1951); III THE ARMY AIR FORCFS IN WORLD WAR li Eu· 
ROPE: ARGUMENT TO V-E DAY, JANUARY 1944 TO MAY 1945, at 493-524 (Wesley Frank Craven 
& James Lea Cate eds., 1951); GIBB MCCAL1., FUGHT MOST SECRET: AlR MISSIONS FOR SOE AND 
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OSS (1981); BEN PARNELL, CARPETBAGGERS: AMERICA'S SECRET WAR IN EUROPE (1987); 
BROOKS RICHARDS, I SECRET FLOlllUS: CLANDESTINE SEA OPERATIONS IN BRITIANY, 1940-
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